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General Provisions, Sales, Bulk Transfers, and 
Documents of Title 
By David Frisch* and john D. Wladis** 
This article reviews case law and related developments during 1987, under 
articles 1, 2, 6, and 7 of the Uniform Commercial Code. 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
CONFLICT OF LAWS 
Potentially important and complex choice of law questions can be avoided if 
the parties agree at the time of contracting which jurisdiction's law shall govern 
in case of dispute. With specific exceptions,' the Uniform Commercial Code 
("U.C.C." or "Code") validates such choice of law agreements if the chosen 
jurisdiction bears a reasonable relation to the transaction.2 Courts continue to 
enforce these choice of law agreements.3 However, a note of warning is in order. 
Choice of law rules dictate only the applicable substantive law. The state in 
which suit is brought (the forum state) is always free to apply its own 
procedural law even when its choice of law rules require it to apply the 
substantive law of another state.4 Thus, for example, the forum state usually 
*Mr. Frisch is a member or the Florida and Rhode Island bars and associate profossor or law at the 
Delaware Law School or Widener University. 
**Mr. Wladis is a member or the New York bar and associate proressor or law at the Delaware 
Law School or Widener University. 
Peter Winship, proressor at Southern Methodist University School or Law, contributed to the 
portion or the survey on Statutes or Limitations. Lawrence B. Hunt contributed to the portions on 
Notice or Breach to Remote Sellers or Manufacturers and Buyer's Money Remedies: Limitations on 
Remedies and Damages. Steven L. Harris, profossor at University or Illinois Law School, prepared 
the portion or the survey on Bulk Transfors. John R. Hobbs aided in the preparation or the portion 
on Warranties. 
Editor's note: All citations to the U.C.C. are to the 1987 Official Text, unless otherwise noted. 
1. U.C.C. § 1-105(2) and sections cited there. 
2. U.C.C. § 1-105(1). This section is part or the conflict or laws rules or the forum state ir that 
state has enacted the U.C.C. The section instructs the forum state to enforce the parties' agreement 
and apply the substantive law or the jurisdiction chosen by the parties if that jurisdiction bears a 
reasonable relation to the transaction and the agreement is valid under U.C.C. § 1-105(2). 
3. Island Creek Coal Co. v. Lake Shore, Inc., 636 F. Supp. 285, 2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 
(Callaghan) 59 (W.D. Va. 1986) (agreement to apply Michigan law enforced where, inter alia, 
seller was a Michigan corporation). 
4. Restatement (Second) or Conflict of Laws§ 122 and comment (1971). 
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applies its own statute of limitations,5 raising the possibility that a court may 
not follow the parties' agreement on choice of law if the issue is a procedural 
one. This is precisely what the court did in Sierra Diesel Injection Service v. 
Burroughs Corp. 6 A federal district court in Nevada declined to enforce the 
parties' agreement that Michigan law would apply where the issue was whether 
the statute of limitations had expired. A computer had been sold that did not 
function properly. The seller attempted to repair, eventually replaced the 
computer, and when the replacement malfunctioned, attempted more repairs. 
Finally the buyer sued and the seller asserted the statute of limitations. On the 
issue of whether attempts to repair tolled the statute of limitations, the magis-
trate applied Michigan law pursuant to the parties' agreement and granted 
summary judgment for the seller. The district court rejected this part of the 
magistrate's report and applied the law of the forum state, Nevada, which the 
court found tolled the statute for repair attempts.7 The court did, however, 
enforce that portion of the parties' agreement, sanctioned by U.C.C. section 2-
725( 1), that reduced the period of limitation from four to two years.8 
In Cherry Creek Dodge, Inc. v. Carter,9 the Wyoming Supreme Court 
decided a choice of law question in the context of an article 2 priority dispute. 
The buyers, residertts of Wyoming, telephoned a Colorado car dealer (Executive 
Leasing) and negotiated the purchase of a 1985 Dodge Ramcharger. The car 
dealer purchased the automobile from its supplier, another Colorado car dealer 
(Cherry Creek Dodge), which knew that the car was being purchased for resale. 
Payment to the supplier was by bank draft. The supplier retained the manufac-
turer's certificate of origin until the draft cleared.10 The seller delivered the car 
to the buyers in Wyoming and received payment there. Subsequently, the bank 
draft given by the seller to its supplier was dishonored. The supplier then sued 
the buyers in Wyoming to replevy the car. There was a true choice of law 
question for, under Colorado law, the supplier would win,11 while under the 
5. Id. § 142. If the forum state determines that the applicable state's substantive law has a 
>tatute or limitations that bars the right, not merely the remedy, then that statute or limitations is 
considered to be substantive and the forum state should apply it, rather than its own. Id. § 143 
comment c (when a statute or limitation bars the right not just the remedy). See Johansen v. E.I. du 
Pont de Nemours & Co., 810 F.2d 1377, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 142 (5th Cir. 1987) 
(applying these rules to the Texas U.C.C. warranty statute or limitations). 
6. 648 F. Supp. 1148, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 646 (D. Nev. 1986). 
7. See infra notes 246-49 and accompanying text for a discussion or this part or the court's 
opinion. 
8. Presumably, the reason is that U.C.C. § 2-725(1) is part or the statute or limitations law or 
the forum state, Nevada. 
9. 733 P.2d 1024, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1791 (Wyo. 1987). 
10. The supplier's retention or the manufacturer's statement or origin apparently was done with 
the intention or retaining title in the supplier until the draft cleared. Cf Epling, Priorities Disputes 
in Motor Vehicles and Other Certificated Goods, 41 Bus. Law. 361, 362 (1986). See U.C.C. § 1-
201(37) (this may be sufficient to create a security interest but not to perfect it). 
11. Guy Martin Buick, Inc. v. Colorado Springs Nat'! Bank, 519 P.2d 354, 14 U.C.C. Rep. 
Serv. (Callaghan) 40 (Colo. 1974). The court acknowledged that when the seller purchases goods 
and pays by check, he acquires a voidable title to the goods. U.C.C. §§ 2-511(3), 2-403(1)(b). Under 
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prevailing rule that the court adopted for Wyoming, the buyers would win. 12 To 
resolve the choice of law question, the court, after noting the absence of 
agreement by the parties, applied the "appropriate relation" test of U.C.C. 
section 1-105( 1) and concluded that the forum state, Wyoming, satisfied this 
test. In so concluding, the court relied upon an earlier Wyoming case13 and the 
fact that the negotiations,14 delivery, and payment in the sale to the buyers all 
occurred in Wyoming to find that the situs of this sale was in Wyoming. 
Therefore, the court applied Wyoming law to resolve the dispute. 15 
THE INTERACTION OF TORT AND CONTRACT: 
ECONOMIC LOSS 
Plaintiffs who sue in tort for purely economic loss have trouble recovering. 
Many courts continue to adhere to the view.that contract-based law, such as the 
U.C.C. warranty provisions, rather than tort law, is the appropriate system for 
compensating economic losses caused by defective goods. These courts find the 
realm of tort law to be compensation for personal injury and property damage. 16 
Consequently, two cases denied recovery to plaintiffs suing in tort to recover 
solely for damage to the goods themselves. In Aloe Coal Co. v. Clark Equipment 
Co.,17 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, applying Pennsylvania law,18 denied 
recovery to a plaintiff suing in negligence. The plaintiff sought the replacement 
cost of a tractor shovel destroyed by a fire allegedly caused by a defect in the 
tractor. The court concluded that this sort of loss was purely economic and that 
contract-based U.C.C. warranty law, not tort law, was appropriate. 
A similar result obtained in Florida Power & Light Co. v. Westinghouse 
Electric Corp. 19 A utility company had sued the manufacturer of leaky steam 
generators in negligence and for breach of warranty for the costs incurred to 
the Code, a person with voidable title can convey a good title to a good faith purchaser for value. 
U.C.C. § 2-403(1). Thus, the buyer ordinarily would prevail against the unpaid supplier. In Guy 
Martin, however, the court relied on a provision of the Colorado Certificate of Title Act to decide 
that no interest in the auto passed to the seller until he received a certificate of title from the 
supplier. Thus, under Colorado law, the buyers in Cherry Creek Dodge would not have prevailed 
because neither they nor the seller had received a certificate of title for the car. 
12. See infra notes 111-13 and accompanying text. 
13. Park County Implement Co. v. Craig, 397 P.2d 800, 2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 379 
(Wyo. 1964). 
14. The court did not describe the negotiations that occurred in Wyoming. Earlier in its opinion, 
it refers to telephone negotiations between the Wyoming buyers and the Colorado seller. 
15. The court's result seems consistent with Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 245 
(1971) (law of location of goods at time of subsequent sale controls). 
16. See, e.g., East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica DeLaval, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 2295, 2299-2304, 
1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 609 (1986); Spring Motors Distrib. v. Ford Motor Co., 98 
N.J. 555, 489 A.2d 660, 667-77, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1184 (1985). 
17. Aloe Coal Co. v. Clark Equip. Co., 816F.2d110, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 966 
(3d Cir. 1987). 
18. There was no relevant decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Thus, the Third Circuit 
had to predict how that court would decide the question. 
19. 510 So. 2d 899, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1759 (Fla. 1987). 
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repair the generators. The Florida Supreme Court ruled that the negligence 
claim could not succeed because the loss for which compensation was sought was 
purely economic.20 
Even when plaintiffs sue in warranty for purely economic loss, they often 
encounter difficulties. In Szajna v. General Motors Corp.,21 the Illinois Supreme 
Court held that the non-privily plaintiff, a subpurchaser, seeking damages in 
warranty from a manufacturer for economic loss only, could not recover under 
that state's version of the Code. However, it did permit the plaintiff to recover 
under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improve-
ment Act ("Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act") because the manufacturer had 
given a written warranty.22 The purchaser of a new automobile commenced a 
class action against the manufacturer when he learned that he and others had 
purchased Pontiac Venturas equipped with Chevette transmissions. The pri-
mary claim was that the automobiles breached the implied warranty of 
merchantability under U.C.C. section 2-314 and under section 110d of the 
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. 23 The manufacturer pleaded lack of privity as 
a defense. As to the Code-based implied warranty, the court held that, without 
privity, there could be no recovery for purely economic loss. Illinois has adopted 
alternative A to U.C.C. section 2-318, which does not abolish privity for a 
subpurchaser of the goods. The court noted that it had previously abolished 
privity for implied warranty suits seeking compensation for personal injuries,24 
but it refused to do so where the damages were purely economic.25 The court 
then found that the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act overrides state law privity 
requirements for both express and implied warranties where the manufacturer 
has given a written warranty.26 Since the manufacturer had given a written 
warranty, the court concluded that the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act applied 
and that the plaintiff could recover purely economic loss for breach of the 
implied warranty of merchantability without showing privity.27 
20. Accord Nelson v. International Harvester Corp., 394 N.W.2d 578, 2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 
(Callaghan) 855 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (suit for economic losses including destruction of purchased 
goods by fire; claims in strict liability and negligence dismissed). 
21. 115 Ill. 2d 294, 503 N.E.2d 760, 2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1268 (1986). 
22. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1982). 
23. 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d) (1982). 
24. Berry v. G.D. Searle & Co., 56 Ill. 2d 548, 309 N.E.2d 550, 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
(Callaghan) 346 (197 4 ). 
25. The court declined to follow, by analogy, its extension of the implied warranty of habitabil-
ity to subpurchasers of a house. 
26. The reasoning is somewhat complex. The clearest explanation is in Schroeder, Private 
Actions Under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 66 Calif. L. Rev. 1, 16-17 (1978). 
27. The plaintiff's other claims were based upon the description of the automobile, "1976 
Pontiac Ventura," as either an express warranty that the automobile would contain a transmission 
designed and built for it, or a representation to that effect which the manufacturer knew to be 
untrue and which, therefore, was fraudulent. The court held that such a description was neither an 
express warranty nor a representation about the nature of the automobile's components. 
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ARTICLE II-SALES OF GOODS 
CONTRACT FORMATION AND TERMS 
Statute of Frauds 
Each year it becomes more apparent that the U.C.C. does not exist in a 
statutory vacuum. Other statutes often impinge on transactions covered by the 
U.C.C., sometimes in a significant way. 28 Rajala v. Allied Corp. 29 posed the 
question whether, under New York law, a writing that met the requirements of 
U.C.C. section 2-201 also had to satisfy New York's more stringent non-Code 
statute of frauds if the alleged contract could not be performed within one 
year.30 The buyer's trustee in bankruptcy produced a written memorandum 
indicating that a contract for sale was made and contained a quantity term, but 
the memorandum omitted any reference to the price, time and place of payment 
or delivery, and the general quality of the goods. Adopting the reasoning of the 
Sixth Circuit in Roth Steel Products v. Sharon Steel Corp.,31 the court found 
that since the two statutes presented an irreconcilable conflict, the special 
statute, U.C.C. section 2-201, must be deemed controlling. 
Without regard to the correctness of the result,32 the vacuousness of the 
court's reasoning is striking. For one thing, the purported conflict between the 
two statutes did not necessarily exist. The requirements of the so-called "gen-
eral statute" are indeed more exacting, but more exacting is not conflicting. It is 
certainly reasonable to assume that most written contracts would satisfy both 
statutes. Moreover, the court ignored whatever policy reasons exist for a more 
rigorous statute of frauds where a contract cannot be performed within one 
year. 33 It may be that, when these reasons are considered, the result in Rajala is 
28. See Frisch, Leary & Wladis, General Provisions, Sales, Bulk Transfers, and Documents of 
Title, 41 Bus. Law. 1363, 1368-71 (1986) ("1986 Annual Survey"); Frisch, Leary & Wladis, 
General Provisions, Sales, Bulk Transfers, and Documents of Title, 42 Bus. Law. 1213, 1217-18 
(1987) ("1987 Annual Survey"). 
29. 66 Bankr. 582, 2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1203 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1986). 
30. New York's non-Code statute requires all material terms of the contract to be in writing. 
N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law§ 5-701 (McKinney Supp. 1988). In contrast, U.C.C. § 2-201 mandates no 
more than a signed writing sufficient to indicate that a contract was made and that contains a 
quantity term, because the contract is not enforceable beyond the quantity stated. 
31. 705 F.2d 134, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1435 (6th Cir. 1983). The court in Roth 
stated: 
Generally, when an irreconcilable conflict exists between a special statute and a general statute, 
the special statute prevails as an exception unless the legislature has expressly manifested a 
contrary intent. [U.C.C. § 2-201 J is a special legislative attempt to tailor the statute of frauds to 
the unique characteristics of a commercial sales transaction. 
Id. at 141, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 1445. 
32. In reaching its conclusion, the court ignored persuasive authority to the contrary. See, e.g., E. 
Farnsworth, Contracts§ 6.2 (1982); R. Nordstrom, Law of Sales§ 28 (1970). 
33. It has been said that "the design of the statute was, not to trust to the memory of witnesses 
for a longer time than one year." Smith v. Westfall, 1 Ld. Raym. 316, 317, 91 Eng. Rep. 1106, 
1107 (K.B. 1697). One commentator, however, has remarked that "of all the provisions of the 
statute, it is the most difficult to rationalize." E. Farnsworth, supra note 32, § 6.4, at 391. 
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bad policy. Finally, what makes one statute general and another special? Could 
not section 2-201 be the general statute, applicable to the larger class of all 
contracts for the sale of goods for the price of $500 or more, while section 5-701 
is the special statute, applicable to the much smaller class of contracts that take 
in excess of one year to perform? 
A related matter is the frequently litigated issue of whether the contract in 
question is a "contract for sale"34 that is covered by the U.C.C. An interesting 
case, not involving the all too common sale-or-service conundrum,35 is Continen-
tal Can Co. v. Poultry Processing, Inc. 36 Continental had agreed to supply 
Mendromak Canning Company with all the cans Mendromak required. When 
Continental became concerned about Mendromak's ability to meet its obliga-
tions, Mendromak assigned the contract to the defendant, Poultry Processing, 
Inc., a related company. When sued by Continental to recover the purchase 
price of cans shipped to Mendromak, Poultry raised the statute of frauds, 
asserting the absence of written evidence that it had accepted the assignment of 
the contract. Although Poultry admitted the assignment, it argued that the 
transaction was not covered by section 2-201, hence, the judicial admissions 
exception did not apply.37 
In an opinion commendable for its pragmatism, the court thought it unneces-
sary to decide whether an assignment is a contract for sale within the meaning 
of section 2-201. As the court saw it, "the purpose of any statute of frauds is 
satisfied by defendant's admission."38 Once the contract is admitted, all of its 
terms, except for quantity, then become fair game for proof by either party. 
Barbara & Ross v. Lifetime Doors, Inc. 39 is an example of the lengths to 
which some courts will go to find a sufficient writing. The buyer alleged that the 
seller had breached a requirements contract. The only written evidence of a 
contract mustered by the buyer were the seller's sales brochures that promised 
new purchasers "continuous production availability ... in full proportion to 
34. The U.C.C. contains no complete definition of the term "contract for sale" but does provide 
that it "includes both a present sale of goods and a contract to sell goods at a future time." U.C.C. 
§ 2-106( 1 ). A "sale," in turn, is defined as "the passing of title from the seller to the buyer for a 
price (section 2-401 )."Id. 
35. See, e.g., 1986 Annual Survey, supra note 28, at 1365-68; 1987 Annual Survey, supra note 
28, at 1216-17. 
36. 649 F. Supp. 570, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 31 (D. Me. 1986). 
37. U.C.C. § 2-201(3)(b) provides: 
(3) A contract which does not satisfy the requirements of subsection (1) but which is valid in 
other respects is enforceable 
(b) if the party against whom enforcement is sought admits in his pleading, testimony or 
otherwise in court that a contract for sale was made, but the contract is not enforceable under 
this provision beyond the quantity of goods admitted .... 
If U.C.C. § 2-201 did not apply, then Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 33, § 51 ( 1978), would. But the latter 
statute does not contain an exception for admissions to the court. 
38. 649 F. Supp. at 574, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 38 (emphasis added). 
39. 810 F.2d 1276, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 41 (4th Cir. 1987). 
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monthly needs," ensuring that purchasers could "order flexible quantities" in 
shipments of a "desired number." According to the Fourth Circuit, these 
written brochures were enough to permit proof that an oral agreement to form a 
requirements contract had been reached. The brochures met the signature 
requirement because the seller's trademark appeared on the brochures40 and 
their reference to meeting the purchaser's needs was a definite enough quantity 
term.41 But are sales brochures "sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale was 
made"? 42 Despite what the Fourth Circuit said, it is hard to believe they are. In 
any event, sellers must now be cautioned that when they give away sales 
literature they may also give away the protection of U.C.C. section 2-201. 
Gestetner Corp. v. Case Equipment Co. 43 explored several of the statutory 
exceptions to the signed memorandum requirement of U.C.C. section 2-201(1 ). 
Case discovered that Gestetner's stencil duplicators, with some modification, 
were suitable for use as part of a color transfer printing process Case had 
developed. Accordingly, Case contacted Gestetner about modifying and then 
selling its stencil duplicators as part of Case's effort to market this process. As a 
result, Gestetner began to sell stencii duplicators, parts, and supplies to Case. 
Soon, however, the relationship soured. Gestetner brought suit against Case for 
goods sold and delivered and not paid for; Case counterclaimed for, among other 
things, breach of contract. 
The First Circuit affirmed the district court's decision that Case had success-
fully overcome the lack of a written contract and proved that Gestetner had 
established Case as the sole distributor of Gestetner equipment adapted to the 
color transfer printing process developed by Case. The circuit court held that 
the contract was enforceable pursuant to U.C.C. sections 2-201 (2)44 and 
2-201 ( 3 )(b ). 45 The admission occurred, first, when Gestetner alleged "an agree-
ment" with Case in its complaint and, second, when Gestetner's president 
testified that he knew Case would modify the Gestetner duplicators, rebox them, 
and market them under a different name, and that Gestetner's relationship with 
Case was unique. The confirmatory memorandum was a letter sent from Case 
to Gestetner which stated that Case looked forward "to its continuing role as 
exclusive dealer for Gestetner." 
40. See U.C.C. § 1-201(39) ("'Signed' includes any symbol executed or adopted by a party with 
present intention to authenticate a writing."). 
41. See also American Original Corp. v. Legend, Inc., 652 F. Supp. 962, 964, 3 U.C.C. Rep. 
Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 65, 67 (D. Del. 1986) (holding that an agreement to sell "all surf clams" was a 
valid output contract and, as such, contained a quantity term sufficient for the purposes of the 
statute of frauds). 
42. u.c.c. § 2-201(1). 
43. 815 F.2d 806, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1328 (1st Cir. 1987). 
44. U.C.C. § 2-201(2) provides: 
Between merchants if within a reasonable time a writing in confirmation of the contract and 
sufficient against the sender is received and the party receiving it has reason to know its 
contents, it satisfies the requirements of subsection (1) against such party unless written notice 
of objection to its contents is given within 10 days after it is received. 
45. See supra note 37. 
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The court next considered whether the absence of an express reference to the 
quantity of goods to be sold in either the letter or the admission evidence 
precluded recovery. Discussing the interplay between U.C.C. sections 2-201 
and 2-306, the court held that the reference to Case's role as exclusive dealer for 
Gestetner was a sufficient quantity term to meet the technical statute of frauds 
requirement. 46 
Battle of the Forms 
U.C.C. section 2-207 does not apply if one party assents to the other's terms, 
as by signing the other's form.4 7 When neither party has signed the other's form, 
one must grapple with that section, an enigma of statutory drafting. 
U.C.C. section 2-207 expressly provides three routes to contract formation, 
and each route has its own procedure for determining the terms of the contract. 
The first route involves written confirmation of an informal agreement. Here 
the parties have, prior to their exchange of written forms, reached an informal 
agreement, usually by telephone. Each party intends its form to confirm this 
informal agreement, yet the forms also often contain terms not discussed.48 
When this happens, there is a contract based on the previous informal agree-
ment; the fact that the confirmations do not match cannot undo the fact that the 
parties previously agreed.49 The terms of the contract consist of the terms of the 
informal agreement, the terms on which the confirmations agree, and terms 
supplied by the Code including subsection 2-207(2).50 The second route is 
contract formation by the exchange of forms where there is no prior informal 
agreement. Rather, the first form received is an offer and the second form, sent 
in response to the first, is an acceptance of that offer.51 U.C.C. section 2-207(1) 
requires that the response to the offer be a "definite and seasonable expression 
of acceptance," but the response need not precisely mirror the offer to satisfy 
that requirement. The drafters intended that the response could contain "minor 
suggestions or proposals" not in the offer and still be such an acceptance.52 If 
46. Although U.C.C. § 2-306( 1) sufficiently cures any indefiniteness of quantity associated with 
output and requirements contracts, it does not necessarily follow that U.C.C. § 2-306(2) does the 
same for exclusive dealership agreements. See Lorenz Supply Co. v. American Standard, Inc., 419 
Mich. 610, 358 N.W.2d 845, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1169 (1984), discussed in the 1986 
Annual Survey, supra note 28, at 1371-72. 
47. Wyandotte Indus. v. E.Y. Neill & Co. (In re First Hartford Corp.), 63 Bankr. 479, 2 
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 465, 477 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) and authorities cited therein. 
48. U.C.C. § 2-207 comment 1. 
49. U.C.C. § 2-207(1 ). Cf U.C.C. § 2-207 comment 2. 
50. U.C.C. § 2-207 comment 6. 
51. U.C.C. § 2-207 comment 1. 
52. U.C.C. § 2-207(1) & comment 1. The drafters' intent seems to have been to adopt the 
common law line of cases deciding that a response stating that it was an acceptance, but indicating 
that additional minor terms were to be part of the contract, was an acceptance of the offer's terms 
plus a proposal to modify the resulting contract by including the minor terms contained in the 
acceptance. Cf Second Draft of A Revised Uniform Sales Act, Alternative Section 3-H and 
Comment 80 (Dec. 1941 ), reprinted in 1 ALI & NCCUSL, Uniform Commercial Code Drafts 360 
( 1984); Lecture by Robert C. Braucher, Article 2-Sales (Feb. 1958), reprinted in ALI & A.B.A., 
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there is such an acceptance with minor proposals then, unless the acceptance is 
expressly conditioned upon the offeror's assent to the proposals, there is an 
acceptance of the offer and a contract on the terms of the offer. The additional 
terms in the acceptance are proposals for addition to the contract and can 
become part of the contract under subsection 2-207(2)53 or if the offeror 
expressly agrees to them.54 The Code will supply additional necessary terms. 55 
The third route is where the parties had no informal agreement and the 
exchange of forms did not produce a contract under subsection 2-207(1 ), but 
nevertheless the seller ships and the buyer accepts the goods. Here a contract is 
implied from the conduct of both parties.56 The contract terms consist of those 
terms on which the forms agree together with supplementary terms provided by 
the Code. 57 Courts sometimes confuse these routes. 
The most glaring example of confusion this year was Skyline Steel Corp. v. 
A.]. Dupuis Co. 58 A subcontractor on a building project (Dupuis) purchased a 
quantity of steel sheet piling and leased an additional quantity of such piling. A 
series of telephone conversations between the parties culminated in two oral 
contracts, one for the sale and the other for the lease. The seller/lessor (Skyline) 
confirmed each contract with a written invoice sent to the buyer/lessee. The 
buyer /lessee took delivery of the piling and later refused to pay in accordance 
with the invoices. The seller /lessor filed suit and the buyer /lessee counter-
claimed. The court gave judgment for the seller/lessor on both its claim and the 
counterclaim. 
Although this decision may be correct on the facts of this case, the analysis is 
confusing. The buyer/lessee raised the section 2-207 issue by defending on the 
ground that it had not agreed to several terms in the seller/lessor's invoices: i) 
the payment term, ii) the initial rental payment provision, iii) the liquidated 
damage clause, and iv) the interest on overdue payments provision. The court 
concluded that each term was part of the contract. As to the first three terms, it 
found that the buyer /lessee had agreed to these terms as part of the oral 
contract.59 Even if it had not so agreed, the court reasoned that the terms were 
part of the contract under subsection 2-207(2) because the buyer /lessee was a 
merchant and had neither objected in writing to the terms within a reasonable 
time after receipt of the invoices nor alleged that the terms materially altered the 
contract. In support of its conclusion that failure to object permitted the terms to 
Uniform Commercial Code in Massachusetts 105 (1958). The common law rule is discussed in 1 S. 
Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts § 79 (rev. ed. 1936); 1 W. Page, The Law of 
Contracts§ 182 (2d ed. 1920). See Restatement of Contracts§ 62 (1932). 
53. u.c.c. § 2-207(2). 
54. U.C.C. § 2-207 comment 3. 
55. Cf U.C.C. § 2-204 comment; J. White & R. Summers, Handbook of the Law Under the 
Uniform Commercial Code § 3-4 (2d ed. 1980). 
56. U.C.C. § 2-207(3) & comment 7. 
57. Id. 
58. 648 F. Supp 360, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 475 (E.D. Mich. 1986). See infra 
notes 217-20 and accompanying text (discussing the liquidated damage clause question in this case). 
59. 648 F. Supp. at 364-66, 374-75, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 482-84, 490. 
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be part of the contract, the court did cite U.C.C. subsection 2-207(2)(c), though 
it relied primarily on subsection 2-201 (2). Subsection 2-201 (2), unlike subsec-
tion 2-207(2)(c), requires objections to be in writing. The court, therefore, 
disregarded testimony that the buyer/lessee orally had objected to the terms in 
the invoice. 60 Here the court erred. The effect of a failure properly to object 
under subsection 2-201 (2) is merely to take away a statute of frauds defense; 
U.C.C. subsection 2-207(2), not subsection 2-201 (2), then governs whether 
terms are part of the contract.61 The oral objection did satisfy subsection 2-
207(2)(c). Thus, the terms should not have become part of the contract under 
section 2-207. 
The court compounded its error by applying the parol evidence rule to the 
case. The buyer /lessee alleged that the payment term orally agreed to was not 
the payment term in the invoice. The court, apparently taking the invoice as a 
"writing intended by the parties as a final expression of their agreement,"62 
disregarded, under the parol evidence rule, testimony that a different payment 
term had been agreed to. Though the court did not explain why the invoice was 
a final expression of the parties' agreement, its citation to a pre-Code case63 
indicates the court may have concluded that the buyer /lessee's failure to object 
to the invoice in writing (even though an oral objection was alleged) rendered it 
a final expression. Neither the Code nor policy supports such a result. Where 
the issue is whether an invoice is a final expression, proof of an oral objection to 
the writing for failing to reflect the agreement is precisely the kind of evidence 
courts need to consider. Perhaps the court really did not believe that the parties 
had discussed or agreed to a payment term different than that contained in the 
invoice. In that event, since the case was tried without a jury, the court should 
have so found, rather than apply the parol evidence rule to disregard the 
testimony. 
Brevet Motors, Inc. v. Venda Co. 64 illustrates both a common misconception 
about subsection 2-207( 1) definite expressions of acceptance and a pitfall for the 
seller in the manner in which the section determines the terms of the contract. 
The buyer (Vendo) sought an additional supply source for motors to be used in 
its vending machines. The buyer submitted designs and plans to the seller 
(Breve!) and tested the seller's motors. In a purchase order, the buyer offered to 
purchase 100,000 motors. The purchase order objected in advance to any of the 
60. Id. at 366 n.3, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 484 n.3. 
61. U.C.C. § 2-201 comment 3. U.C.C. § 2-207 comment 6 was amended in 1966 specifically to 
emphasize this distinction, although the Michigan law applied to this case enacted the U.C.C. 
before this amendment. Consequeruly, the amendment does not appear in Michigan's version of the 
Official Comments. See Mich. Stat. Ann.§ 19-2207, Comments of NCCUSL and ALI (Callaghan 
1981). 
62. u.c.c. § 2-202. 
63. In the case cited, Watson-Higgins Milling Co. v. Graczyk, 253 Mich. 175, 234 N.W. 132 
( 1931 ), the court reasoned that an invoice was a final expression because the recipient did not object 
to it. 
64. 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1347 (D.N.J. 1986). 
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seller's terms differing from those in the purchase order. 65 The purchase order 
also provided that the seller would indemnify the buyer against all liability for 
damages incurred by the buyer for defective goods. The seller responded with an 
acknowledgment stating "we accept this order based on the following interpre-
tation and terms." The acknowledgment also contained a provision limiting the 
buyer's damages to the original selling price and disclaiming liability for 
consequential damages. 
Subsequently, the buyer requested and the seller shipped the first batch of 
motors. A dispute arose over the quality of the motors. The seller sued for the 
price and other damages. The buyer counterclaimed for damages including 
consequential damages, prompting the seller to move for partial summary 
judgment dismissing the buyer's counterclaims on the ground that the seller's 
disclaimer of liability for consequential damages was part of the contract. The 
court denied the motion, finding that the consequential damages liability dis-
claimer was not part of the contract. The court formed the contract under 
subsection 2-207( 1 ), presumably concluding that the seller's acknowledgment 
was a definite expression of acceptance not expressly conditioned upon the 
buyer's assent to the seller's terms. 
This conclusion illustrates a common misconception about subsection 2-
207(1) definite expressions of acceptance. The common misconception is that 
the typical acknowledgment form that agrees with the offer on the dickered 
terms but varies from the offer's boilerplate terms in its own boilerplate is an 
acceptance of the offer under subsection 2-207( 1) unless there is language in the 
acknowledgment expressly conditioning acceptance on assent to the terms of the 
acknowledgment. 66 In effect, this kind of typical response is treated as a definite 
expression of acceptance. Yet, this is not what the drafters of the section 
intended. The drafters intended to treat as a definite expression of acceptance 
only a response with minor suggestions, because it could reasonably be inter-
preted as an acceptance of the buyer's offer with a proposal to modify the 
ensuing contract by including the minor suggestions.67 A response to an offer 
that significantly varies the offer, either in dickered terms or boilerplate, is not a 
definite expression of acceptance.68 In Breve! Motors, the seller's acknowledg-
ment was such a response. Thus it was not a definite expression of acceptance. 
65. "ANY ACKNOWLEDGMENTS which take exceptions to the terms specified on the face 
of this order, and on the back of this order, will not be considered as binding upon the Buyer unless 
such changes are agreed to by Buyer in writing." Id. at 1348. 
66. See, e.g., R. Nordstrom, Handbook of the Law of Sales§ 37, at 94-96 (1970); J. White & 
R. Summers, supra note 55, § 1-2, at 27 (2d ed. 1980). 
67. See supra note 52. 
68. Support for the view that a response substantially different in boilerplate from the offer can 
be an acceptance under§ 2-207(1) usually is based on§ 2-207(2)(b). That subsection provides that 
terms which materially alter the contract cannot become part of the contract. Thus, it is argued, the 
drafters foresaw that some contracts could be formed when a response materially altered the offer it 
accepted. In fact, this was not the drafters' intent. The material alteration test is contained in § 2-
207(2) to cover contracts based on informal agreement when the subsequent written confirmations 
vary substantially from the informal agreement. In this situation, the parties clearly had a deal and 
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Furthermore, the court could have interpreted the seller's acknowledgment to 
be expressly conditional upon assent to the seller's terms so that it was not an 
acceptance. Under either approach, there is no contract under subsection 2-
207( 1). There is, however, a contract under subsection 2-207(3), since the buyer 
requested, the seller shipped, and the buyer accepted part of the goods. 
Regardless of whether the contract is formed under subsection 2-207(1) or 
(3), the seller's consequential damage liability disclaimer is not part of the 
contract. If the contract were formed under either subsection, the seller's 
disclaimer could be part of the contract only under subsection 2-207(2) or 
through trade usage, course of dealing, or course of performance. Under the 
facts of this case, the disclaimer cannot come in under subsection 2-207(2), 
because the buyer had objected both generally and specifically to the seller's 
disclaimer. The general objection under subsection 2-207(2)(a) is the purchase 
order provision that changes in the purchase order terms are not binding unless 
the buyer agrees to them in writing. The specific objection is implied from the 
fact that a provision in the purchase order would make the seller liable without 
limitation; the direct conflict between this provision and the seller's disclaimer 
constitutes an objection under subsection 2-207(2)(c).69 Since no evidence of a 
trade usage, course of dealing, or course of performance excluded liability for 
consequential damages, the seller's disclaimer did not become part of the 
contract. 
This case also illustrates a pitfall for the seller in the manner that section 2-
207 determines the contract's terms. If the buyer includes in his form a 
provision objecting generally to all terms other than those in his form, he is 
guaranteed that, if a contract is formed, he will have the benefit of the Code's 
gap fillers as they may be modified by trade usage, course of performance, or 
course of dealing.70 These gap fillers favor the buyer; for example, they give him 
the only question is the exact terms. Thus, in early drafts of this section, before the definite 
expression of acceptance and written confirmation routes were combined into one subdivision, the 
material alteration test applied only to the written confirmation route. See, e.g., Revised Uniform 
Sales Act, Third Draft, 1943: 
SECTION 20. ADDITIONAL TERMS IN ACCEPTANCE OR CONFIRMATION. 
(1) Where a definite expression of acceptance is accompanied by additional terms it shall be 
construed in case of doubt as constituting an acceptance accompanied by proposals for 
modification or addition. 
(2) Where a contract for sale is followed within a reasonable time by a written confirmation 
stating terms additional to those originally agreed upon 
(a) such additional terms are to be construed as proposals for modification or addition; and 
(b) between merchants such additional terms, subject to the requirements of Section 24 with 
respect to unconscionable contracts, become part of the contract if they do not alter the essential 
terms and are not objected to within a reasonable time. 
69. U.C.C. § 2-207 comment 6. See also ALI & NCCUSL Transcript of Proceedings, Annual 
Meeting of A.L.1. in Joint Session with NCCUSL in Washington, D.C. 28 (May 16-18, 1951), 
reprinted in ALI, A.L.1. Archives Publications (microfiche) (Soia Mentschikoff speaking). 
70. None of the seller's terms can become part of the contract. U.C.C. § 2-207(2)(a). Even if the 
buyer's terms are not part of the contract, the resulting gaps are filled with such terms as the Code 
supplies. U.C.C. § 2-207(3) & comment 6. 
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full warranty protection for all his injuries.71 Often this protection is more than 
a willing seller will give. Yet, short of getting the buyer's specific assent, the 
seller can do little to avoid the gap fillers. If he merely sends back his form 
containing his own terms and appropriate protests, and later he ships the goods 
and the buyer accepts them, the contract will consist of the terms on which the 
forms agree, together with the gap fillers. 72 Short of refusing to ship until the 
buyer specifically assents to his terms, the seller cannot avoid the gap fillers. 73 
Thus, the moral of section 2-207 is caveat venditor. 
Maxon Corp. v. Tyler Pipe lndustries74 illustrates how section 2-207 often 
can make an easy decision difficult. The buyer (Tyler) sent a purchase order to 
the seller (Maxon) for two "pre-mix blower-mixer" units ("mixers"). The 
purchase order contained a provision stating that conditions in the seller's 
acknowledgment that conflicted with the buyer's terms were not binding unless 
accepted by the buyer in writing. It also contained a seller's warranty against 
defects. The seller's acknowledgment contained a buyer indemnity provision in 
favor of the seller; it also was expressly conditioned on the buyer's assent to the 
seller's terms. The goods were shipped and accepted. One of the mixers 
exploded, injuring the buyer's employee. The employee sued the seller. The 
seller settled this suit. It then sued the buyer based on the indemnity clause in its 
acknowledgment. The trial court granted the buyer's motion for summary 
judgment. 
The decision was affirmed on appeal. On these facts, there was a contract 
under subsection 2-207(3), and the issue was whether the seller's indemnity 
provision was part of the contract under subsection 2-207(2). The seller argued 
that whether the indemnity provision did not materially alter the contract under 
subsection 2-207(2)(b) and thus could be part of the contract, was a question of 
fact which could not be resolved by summary judgment. The court found the 
question to be one of law. 75 The trial court could have placed its decision on 
firmer ground, making the court of appeal's affirmance easier, by finding, as did 
the court in Breve! Motors, that the provision in the buyer's purchase order 
requiring the buyer's written assent to the seller's terms was a general objection 
to the seller's terms under subsection 2-207(2)(a). In this view, the seller's term 
was not part of the contract regardless of whether or not it was a material 
alteration. 
71. U.C.C. §§ 2-312 to -315, 2-714, 715. 
72. u.c.c. § 2-207(3) 
73. The best the seller could do would be to prove a trade usage, course of dealing, or course of 
performance inconsistent with the relevant gap filler. In such a situation the gap fillers yield, 
because they apply only in the absence of agreement, and trade usage, course of dealing, and course 
of performance are part of the parties' agreement. U.C.C. § 1-201(3) & comment 3 (definition of 
"Agreement"); U.C.C. § 1-205 comment 4 (gap fillers yield to usages of trade). 
74. 497 N.E.2d 570, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 52 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986). 
75. Although this court cited authority for its conclusion, id. at 577, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 
(Callaghan) at 61, courts generally find the issue of material alteration to be a question of fact. See 2 
R. Anderson, Uniform Commercial Code § 2:207:20 (3d ed. 1982 & 1987 Cum. Supp.). 
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The appellate court, in dictum, found the indemnity provision to be unen-
forceable because it was unconscionable under U.C.C. section 2-302, even if it 
were part of the contract. If found procedural unconscionability because the 
provision appeared at the very end of a long paragraph titled "Warnings and 
Covenants," the first two thirds of which dealt with installation and mainte-
nance of the mixers. It found substantive unconscionability based upon Indiana 
public policy, manifested in its products liability statute, to prohibit the manu-
facturer of defective goods from shifting the risk of liability to others.76 
As the cases in this section illustrate, courts mostly arrive at fair results, 
although section 2-207 is so unhappily drafted that the courts' task in explain-
ing their results is unduly complicated. 
WARRANTIES 
General 
The sale of goods ordinarily carries with it the seller's warranty of title. 77 In 
Frank Arnold Contractors v. Vilsmeier Auction Co., 78 Pennsylvania law was 
applied to hold that the warranty of title is breached if the buyer is sued by 
someone claiming the goods, even if the claim is invalid, so long as it was a 
"substantial shadow" on the buyer's title. 
An auctioneer (Vilsmeier) sold a hydraulic excavator on behalf (apparently) 
of its owner McGinn. The auctioneer announced that the equipment was free of 
any liens, encumbrances, or security interests. In fact, a secured party (ITT) 
claimed a perfected security interest in the excavator. The buyer (Arnold) 
purchased the excavator at the auction and began to use it. Subsequently, the 
secured creditor sued the buyer for possession of the excavator, and on advice of 
counsel, the buyer surrendered the excavator. The buyer then sued the auction-
eer for breach of its warranty of title. The district court directed a verdict for the 
buyer on the liability issue. The jury then assessed damages. 
On appeal, the auctioneer asserted that the directed verdict on liability was 
improper. It argued that there was a jury question as to the validity of the 
security interest and that this question precluded the directed verdict. The 
district court had determined that the validity of the security interest was 
irrelevant.79 The Third Circuit agreed. Citing a long list of cases, the court 
predicted that Pennsylvania would adopt the rule that, so long as the third party 
claim was a "substantial shadow" on the buyer's title, it did not matter whether 
76. The court also held, in dictum, that the indemnity provision was unconscionable. Maxon 
Corp. v. Tyler Pipe Indus., 497 N.E. 2d 570, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 52 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1986). 
77. U.C.C. § 2-312(1), (2). 
78. 806 F.2d 462, 2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 845 (3d Cir. 1986). 
79. The fact that the buyer presumably had notice of the perfected security interest was also not 
relevant. Under U.C.C. § 2-312( 1 )(b), knowledge, not notice, of the asserted encumbrance is 
necessary to avoid the warranty. See U.C.C. § 2-312 comment 1. "Knowledge" and "notice" are 
defined in U.C.C. § 1-201(25). 
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the claim was valid.80 The court then found the secured creditor's claim to be a 
cloud on the buyer's title81 and affirmed the directed verdict for liability. 
Several cases involved the question of whether the seller's statements, made 
after agreement had been reached, could constitute warranties. In Gold'N 
Plump Poultry v. Simmons Engineering Co.,62 Minnesota law was applied to 
hold that seller's statements after delivery, made to encourage the buyer to pay 
the purchase price, cannot constitute warranties. Armour Foods had purchased 
from the manufacturer (Simmons) two chicken processing machines. Problems 
with the machines ensued because Armour's chickens were larger than the 
chickens for which the manufacturer had designed the machines. Armour was 
aware of the size problem when it purchased the machines. The manufacturer 
then offered to take back the machines, but Armour insisted that the manufac-
turer attempt to modify them. The manufacturer agreed. To induce Armour to 
pay the purchase price, the manufacturer sent a letter to Armour promising to 
refund the purchase price if the machines did not function "within reasonable 
tolerance." This letter satisfied Armour and it paid the purchase price. Shortly 
thereafter, Armour sold its plant, including the machines, to Gold'N Plump. 
Although it knew of Armour's problems with the machines, Gold'N Plump 
purchased them "as is" and paid Armour a sum equal to Armour's original 
purchase price. For several weeks the manufacturer continued its efforts to 
modify the machines. Apparently the efforts were unsuccessful, for Gold'N 
Plump sued the manufacturer seeking a refund of the original purchase price. 
After a bench trial, the district court entered judgment for the manufacturer. 
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed with one dissent. Gold'N Plump had 
failed to get an assignment of Armour's rights against the manufacturer; thus 
Gold'N Plump had to argue that the manufacturer's letter promising a refund 
to Armour was an express warranty of which Gold'N Plump was a third party 
beneficiary under U.C.C. section 2-318. 83 The circuit court disagreed. It con-
cluded that the manufacturer's promise was not an express warranty because it 
was not made at the time of sale; the court reasoned that title passed to the 
buyer at this time, which was usually the time of delivery. 84 It then ruled that, 
since U.C.C. section 2-318 applies only to "seller's warranty" and since the 
manufacturer's promise was not a warranty, U.C.C. section 2-318 did not 
80. See 806 F.2d at 464, 2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 848-49 (other cases cited). See 
also Editor's Note, 2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 845-46. 
81. The court did not elaborate on the meaning or "substantial shadow," a term it borrowed 
from American Container Corp. v. Hanley Trucking Corp., 111 N.J. Super. 332, 268 A.2d 313 
(Ch. Div. 1970). Obviously, the assertion or frivolous third party claims should not be a breach or 
the warranty or title. See]. White & R. Summers, supra note 55, § 9-11, at 361-64 (2d ed. 1980), 
for a discussion or what kinds or third party claims should be a breach or the warranty. 
82. 805 F.2d 1312, 2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1232 (8th Cir. 1986). 
83. Minnesota basically has enacted alternative C to U.C.C. § 2-318, Minn. Stat. Ann.§ 336 2-
318 (West Supp. 1987). However, the Minnesota version cannot be excluded or limited under any 
circumstances. 
84. The court based its reasoning upon the definition or "sale" in U.C.C. § 2-106(1 ). 
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apply. Thus Gold'N Plump could not assert a right of refund under the 
manufacturer's letter. 
In the dissent, Judge Heaney argued that there was no requirement that 
statements be made before or at the time of sale to constitute warranties. He 
would have held the promise of a refund to be a warranty and Gold'N Plump to 
be a third party beneficiary of that warranty under U.C.C. section 2-318. 
'f.he circuit court's decision that statements made after delivery of the goods 
cannot be warranties seems unduly restrictive.85 U.C.C. section 2-313(1) does 
not explicitly impose a temporal element for statements to qualify as warranties, 
though many courts find a temporal element in the requirement that express 
warranties be part of the "basis of the bargain."86 Clearly the drafters intended 
that statements made after the deal had been closed could be warranties.87 But 
how soon after? The following analysis provides a partial answer to this 
question. There are two essential elements to the contract of sale: the seller's 
obligation to deliver conforming goods and the buyer's obligation to accept and 
pay for these goods.88 If statements made to induce the buyer to take delivery are 
warranties, then statements made to induce the buyer to pay the purchase price 
should also be warranties. In both cases, the statements are made to induce the 
buyer to perform his essential obligations. In a sense, these statements are part 
of the "basis of the bargain." If the statements are made after the original deal 
has been negotiated so that they are not part of that deal, the comments state 
that the statements become a modification of the original deal.89 The statements 
are thus part of the basis of the modified bargain and so are warranties.Do In 
essence then, the question should not be whether the statements are made after 
delivery but whether the statements may fairly be regarded as modifications of 
the original contract. If so, they are enforceable without consideration and can 
be warranties.D1 Statements made to induce a buyer to perform its essential 
obligations under a deal clearly qualify under the foregoing test. Thus, in 
Gold'N Plump, the manufacturer's promise of a refund that induced the buyer 
to pay the purchase price would seem to be a warranty and, as such, Gold'N 
Plump should be able to recover on it pursuant to U.C.C. section 2-318. 
85. See Annotation, Affirmations or Representations Made After the Sale Is Closed as Basis of 
Warranty Under U.C.C. § 2-313(l)(a), 47 A.L.R.4th 200 (1986). The phrase "basis of the 
bargain" appears in U.C.C. § 2-313(1). 
86. U.C.C. § 2-313 comment 7. 
87. It also may have the undesirable effect of making the issue of whether after-sale statements 
are warranties turn on title questions. One of the express purposes of article 2 was to minimize the 
significance of title. U.C.C. § 2-401 preamble & comment 1. See also U.C.C. § 2-101 comment; 
infra note 148. 
88. U.C.C. § 2-301. 
89. U.C.C. § 2-313 comment 7. 
90. 2 W. Hawkland, Uniform Commercial Code Series§ 2-313:05, at 302 (1984). 
91. U.C.C. § 2-209( 1 ). The modification must be sought for a legitimate commercial reason to 
be enforceable without consideration. U.C.C. § 2-209 comment 2. 
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Moldex, Inc. v. Ogden Engineering Corp. 92 is another case involving after-
deal statements. The case involved a contract for the sale of oriented nylon. 
After partial delivery, the buyer inquired of the seller whether dyeing the nylon 
would change its properties and was told it would not. The buyer then took 
delivery of additional nylon. When a customer of the buyer claimed the nylon 
was defective, the buyer refused to pay the seller and the seller sued.93 One of 
the buyer'~ defenses was breach of express warranty based upon the seller's 
statement that dyeing would not change the properties of the nylon. On the 
seller's motion for summary judgment, the court ruled that if the statement were 
not a warranty, it could still be enforceable as a modification of the original 
deal. Concluding that whether the statement was enforceable was a jury 
question, the court denied the summary judgment motion.94 
Ingram River Equipment v. Potts Industries95 considered the relationship 
between the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular 
purpose where the seller submitted construction plans for the goods sold to the 
buyer. The buyer (Ingram, a barge operator) contracted with the seller (Potts, a 
boat builder) for four barges equipped with a steam-coil system that facilitated 
unloading by heating heavy liquid cargo. The seller submitted plans for the 
barges including the steam-coil system to the buyer and the buyer approved 
them. The seller expressly warranted that the barges would conform to the 
plans.96 After taking delivery of the barges, the buyer discovered leaks in the 
steam coils caused by residual water collecting at low points in the coils, freezing 
and splitting the coils. The buyer sued the seller alleging negligent design, strict 
liability in tort, breach of the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness 
for a particular purpose, and breach of an oral express warranty. 97 The district 
court gave judgment for the buyer on the negligent design and breach of implied 
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose.98 It rejected the warranty of 
merchantability theory on the ground that the seller's express warranty that the 
92. 652 F. Supp. 584, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 572 (D. Conn. 1987). 
93. In a related state court suit, the buyer's customer sued the buyer, who then vouched in the 
seller. The court found the buyer liable to its customer and the seller liable to the buyer. Ogden 
Health Prods. v. Ogden Eng'g Corp., Civ. No. C-84-198 (Ind. Cir. Ct. Mar. 18, 1985) (findings of 
fact and conclusions of law), ajf'd on other grounds sub nom. Moldex, Inc. v. Ogden Health Prods., 
489 N.E.2d 130, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1304 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986). 
94. The court also discussed the binding effect of the judgment in a related suit in which the 
buyer had vouched in the seller under U.C.C. 2-607(5). For a discussion of this point, see infra text 
accompanying notes 138-43. 
95. 816 F.2d 1231, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 977 (8th Cir. 1987). 
96. Ingram River Equip. v. Potts Indus., 573 F. Supp. 896, 898, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
(Callaghan) 88, 89 (E.D. Mo. 1983). 
97. Id. 
98. Id. The district court rejected the strict liability in tort theory because the defective design 
had not made the barges unreasonably dangerous. It rejected the oral express warranty theory, 
finding that the oral statements in question were not warranties because they were made while the 
barges were being built. 
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goods would conform to the plans displaced the warranty of merchantability.99 
Eventually the negligent design theory was rejected, 100 so that the Eighth Circuit 
had before it only the implied fitness warranty theory. It affirmed the district 
court's decision that the particular purpose warranty had been made and 
breached. The court concluded that the "particular purpose" which gave rise to 
the warranty could not be an "ordinary purpose" of the barge. 101 The court may 
have believed it was compelled so to conclude because the district court had 
found (and the buyer did not appeal) that the seller had warranted the fitness of 
the barge for a particular purpose but not its fitness for ordinary purposes. 102 In 
any event, the Eighth Circuit joined a long list of other courts in concluding 
that, to give rise to a particular purpose warranty under U.C.C. section 2-315, 
the buyer's "particular purpose" must be something other than an "ordinary 
purpose" of the goods. 103 
99. The district court cited comment 9 to U.C.C. § 2-316 and § 2-317(c) to support its 
conclusion. Comment 9, however, analyzes the situation in which the buyer furnishes the plans to 
the seller. In that circumstance, there is no implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, 
presumably because the buyer has not relied upon the seller. Nor is there an implied warranty of 
merchantability, for that warranty has been displaced under U.C.C. § 2-317(c) by the usual express 
warranty that the goods will comply with the plans. Under the analysis in the comment, the buyer 
bears the risk that the goods, if constructed in conformity to his plans, will not suit his purpose. This 
result is fair, since the buyer designed the goods and the seller merely followed the buyer's design. 
Where the seller used his own plans, as in Ingram River, and absent unusual circumstances, the 
seller's express warranty that the goods will conform to the design should not displace the implied 
warranty of merchantability. Where the seller has designed the goods, the buyer should not have the 
risk that the goods, if built as designed by the seller, will not be fit for their ordinary purposes. 
Courts agree; thus, sellers often are held liable for defective design on a theory of breach of implied 
warranty of merchantability. See 3 R. Anderson, Uniform Commercial Code § 2-314:83 (3d ed. 
1983 & 1987 Supp.). In Ingram River, the seller designed the steam-coil system. Though the buyer 
approved the plans, the district court found that the buyer had no special expertise and was relying 
upon the seller to furnish proper plans. Thus, the court should have found that the seller made an 
implied warranty of merchantability for the steam-coil system it designed and built. 
100. In a previous appeal, the Eighth Circuit had affirmed the district court on the negligent 
design theory. 756 F.2d 649 (8th Cir. 1985). The Supreme Court later decided that neither 
negligence nor strict liability in tort would lie where the defect caused purely economic loss such as 
damage to the goods sold. East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 2295, 1 
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 609 (1986). Consequently, the Supreme Court vacated the 
Eighth Circuit's affirmance in Ingram River on the negligent design theory and remanded for 
further consideration. 106 S. Ct. 3269 ( 19B6). 
101. "[T]he key inquiry is ... whether the buyer's use is sufficiently different from the 
customary use of the goods to make it not or~inary." Ingram River Equip. v. Potts Indus., 816 F.2d 
1231, 1233-34, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 977, 981 (8th Cir. 1987). 
102. See supra note 99. 
103. Authority is split on this point. The cases are collected in B. Clark & C. Smith, The Law 
of Product Warranties~ 6.02[2] nn.26, 27 (1984 & 1987 Cum. Supp.). 
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PERFORMANCE 
Title, Creditors, and Good Faith Purchasers 
Decisions during this last repot"ting period indicate a continuing tension 
between U.C.C. section 2-403 and state statutes that govern certificates of title 
and the registration of motor vehicles. An attempt to defeat the application of 
section 2-403 failed in Dartmouth Motor Sales v. Wilcox. 104 Dartmouth Motor 
Sales sold a car to Wilcox, who purported to be a dealer but was not, and whose 
check subsequently bounced. Wilcox thereafter sold the car to Campbell, a 
dealer, who in turn sold it to Willis, a consumer. The outcome of Dartmouth's 
suit to recover the car from Willis rode on whether U.C.C. section 2-403 took 
precedence over the New Hampshire automobile title statute. 105 If it did, then 
the case becomes classic textbook: Wilcox's fraudulent purchase resulted in his 
receiving voidable title106 and when he transferred the car to Campbell, a good 
faith purchaser, that title ripened into a good title that was later transferred to 
Willis. 107 The hitch, however, was that because Wilcox was mistakenly treated 
as a dealer by both Dartmouth and Campbell, the transfer to him from 
Dartmouth and from him to Campbell did not comply with the title statute. 108 
What the Supreme Court of New Hampshire had to decide was whether such 
noncompliance voided all of the transfers including the later transfer between 
Campbell and Willis. 
In an opinion marked by the court's obvious objective of not letting noncom-
pliance with a technical statute deprive an innocent party of a valuable property 
right, the court simply ignored the language of the title statute and held that 
since the transfers were made by a facially valid title certificate, section 2-403 
controlled the outcome.109 The reason: Awarding the car to Dartmouth would 
serve neither statute's purpose since Dartmouth was in a better position than 
the others to have detected and foiled Wilcox's scheme. 110 
Similarly, Cherry Creek Dodge, Inc. v. Carter111 held that provisions of the 
Wyoming title statutes would not supersede the U.C.C. The buyers, residents of 
Wyoming, telephoned a Colorado car dealer (Executive Leasing) and negotiated 
the purchase of a 1985 Dodge Ramcharger. The car dealer purchased the 
104. 128 N.H. 526, 517 A.2d 804, 2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 895 (1986). 
105. The language of the title statute leaves no room for the application of the good faith 
purchase doctrine embodied in U.C.C. § 2-403. See N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 261:14 (1982) ("a 
transfer by an owner is not effective until the provisions of this section and RSA 261: 19 have been 
complied with .... "). 
106. See U.C.C. § 2-403(1)(b), (c). 
107. Id. § 2-403( 1 ). 
108. Transfers by non-dealers are governed by N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 261:14 (1982), whereas 
transfers by dealers are governed by the less demanding requirements of N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§ 261:15 (1982). 
109. If the title certificate was facially invalid, it would make no difference which statute 
controlled. The recipient of such a title could hardly qualify as a good faith purchaser under U.C.C. 
§ 2-403(1). 
110. 128 N.H. at 530, 517 A.2d at 807, 2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 899-900. 
111. 733 P.2d 1024, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1791 (Wyo. 1987). 
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automobile from its supplier, another Colorado car dealer (Cherry Creek 
Dodge), who knew that the car was being purchased for resale. Payment to the 
supplier was by bank draft. The supplier retained the manufacturer's certificate 
of origin until the draft cleared. The seller delivered the car to the buyers in 
Wyoming and received payment there. Subsequently, the bank draft given by 
the seller to its supplier was dishonored. The supplier then sued the buyers in 
Wyoming to replevy the car. 112 Without so much as a reference to the substance 
of the pertinent motor vehicle statute nor even the slightest stab at analysis, the 
Wyoming Supreme Court summarily stated that it agreed with the majority 
rule that U.C.C. section 2-403 was controlling. 113 
Unfortunately, motor vehicle statutes are not the only statutes that can cause 
litigation over section 2-403's scope of application. Farmers Livestock Exchange 
of Bismarck v. Ulmer114 involved a purported conflict between section 2-403 and 
a North Dakota statute governing auction sales of livestock.115 Ulmer, a cattle 
buyer, purchased cattle on credit from Farmers Livestock on the false represen-
tation that he was buying on consignment for someone else. Ulmer then sold the 
cattle through a livestock auction market to which he was already indebted. To 
satisfy that debt, the proceeds of the sale were applied to Ulmer's account. For 
unexplained reasons, Farmers Livestock sued the auction market to recover the 
sale proceeds. An explanation was needed because the cattle were owned by an 
undisclosed third party who had consigned them to Farmers Livestock. This fact 
defeated Farmers Livestock's claim under the auction statute, but not before the 
North Dakota Supreme Court, relying on U.C.C. section 2-102, recognized that 
statute's supremacy over the Code.116 The court next considered the respective 
rights of the parties under section 2-403 and correctly decided that the auction 
market lacked the status of either a buyer117 or a purchaser. 118 What finally 
decided the case was the court's view that the loss should be borne by the party 
who best could have avoided it, Farmers Livestock. The court overlooked the 
obvious point that recovery from the auction market would do no more than 
return it to its pre-transaction position. 
112. Wyoming law is applied because Wyoming was the situs of the ultimate sale. 733 P.2d at 
1027, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1794-95. But why should the place of the last sale be 
given more weight than the place of the fraudulent sale? For a discussion of this portion of the 
court's opinion, see supra notes 9-15 and accompanying text. 
113. Although the court cites several cases representative of the majority view, 733 P.2d at 1028, 
3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1796-97, it cites none for "the minority view followed only 
by Colorado and possibly Missouri." 733 P.2d at 1027, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 
1795. See Epling, Priorities Disputes in Motor Vehicles and in Other Certificated Goods, 41 Bus. 
Law. 361 (1983), for an excellent discussion of the U.C.C. and certificate of title statutes. 
114. 393 N.W.2d 65, 2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1194 (N.D. 1986). 
115. See N.D. Cent. Code§ 36-05-12 (1980) (providing in part that "[t]he operator of each 
livestock auction market ... shall be liable to the rightful owner of any livestock sold through the 
auction market for the net proceeds in cash received therefor."). 
116. U.C.C. § 2-102 expressly preserves "any statute regulating sales to consumers, farmers, or 
other specified classes of buyers." 
117. See U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(a). 
118. See U.C.C. § 1-201(33). 
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Goods held on "sale or return" are subject to the holder's creditors by virtue 
of U.C.C. section 2-326. Consignors often seek to escape the application of this 
section by arguing that the consignee must be the seller of consignor's goods. In 
past years, most courts have been unreceptive to this argument. 119 This year has 
been no different. The most interesting case in this area is First National Bank 
of Blooming Prairie v. Olsen. 12° Cattle were delivered to a feedlot operator who 
was also engaged in the business of selling cattle. This bailment, however, was 
for the purpose of fattening the cattle, not for the purpose of sale. Notwithstand-
ing the limited nature of the bailment, the feedlot's secured creditor sought to 
fatten its coffers by laying claim to the cattle. 121 The trial court held that U.C.C. 
section 2-326 did not apply because the cattle were not delivered for sale. It also 
believed that because the secured creditor knew or should have known that a 
substantial number of cattle were being custom-fed it was estopped from 
claiming the benefits of the section. 
The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed, but not because section 2-326 was 
inapplicable. The court was reluctant to treat the delivery of goods to a person 
who deals in like goods under a different name than that of the consignor as 
anything but a sale or return, regardless of the intended character of the 
transaction. 122 Rather, its affirmance was based on the secured creditor's actual 
knowledge of the consignment. The court carefully noted that its determination 
did not depend upon equitable principles but was dictated by its interpretation 
of U.C.C. section 2-326.123 
This case nicely illustrates the excessive influence that ostensible ownership 
concerns continue to exert on courts and commentators alike. The fear that the 
effect of divorcing ownership from possession will somehow mislead those who 
come into contact with the possessor seems to be the strongest, and perhaps the 
only, justification for stretching U.C.C. section 2-326 so as to encompass not-
for-sale bailments. 124 But as recent scholarship suggests, such concern is based 
on too many untested assumptions and ignores too many competing policies to 
warrant the position of influence it now holds. 125 
The related proposition that a creditor with knowledge of the consignment 
loses the benefits of section 2-326 is also questionable. This too assumes the 
119. See Leary & Frisch, Uniform Commercial Code Annual Survey: General Provisions, Sales, 
Bulk Transfers, and Documents of Title, 40 Bus. Law. 1457, 1473 (1985). 
120. 403 N.W.2d 661, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 554 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987). 
121. When a secured creditor is the claimant, U.C.C. § 2-326 must be read in conjunction with 
U.C.C. § 9-114. 
122. This year, the same view also surfaced in Escrow Connection v. Haas, 189 Cal. App. 3d 
1640, 235 Cal. Rptr. 200, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 547 (1987). 
123. The court's conclusion is based on a misreading of U.C.C. § 2-326(3)(b). What is generally 
known by creditors is relevant; what is known by a particular creditor is not. 
124. When stretched this far, U.C.C. § 2-326 begins to look a great deal like a creditors' version 
of U.C.C. § 2-403(2) (merchant has power to transfer title of entruster to buyer in the ordinary 
course of business). 
125. See generally Mooney, The Mystery and Myth of "Ostensible Ownership" and Article 9 
Filing: A Critique of Proposals to Extend Filing Requirements to Leases, 39 Ala. L. Rev. 683, 
(1988). 
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paramount importance of ostensible ownership concerns. However, the cost of 
interposing into section 2-326 litigation the issue of what each creditor knew 
and the distortion that different degrees of knowledge among competing credi-
tors could have on the application of fairly predictable priority rules is not 
mentioned. 
TENDER, CURE, AND NOTICE 
Tender of delivery often becomes a significant event through the application 
of various U.C.C. sections.126 Regardless of the reason for the inquiry, being 
able to tell if and when a tender has occurred is important. 127 Unfortunately, the 
Supreme Court of Nebraska's opinion in Crowder v. Aurora Co-Operative 
Elevator Co. 128 offers very little guidance in this regard. The case involved a 
contract for the sale of corn that required delivery,_ at the buyer's elevator. The 
trial court concluded that the seller had duly tendered and directed a verdict in 
his favor. 129 According to the seller's evidence, the tender consisted of repeated 
communications with the buyer concerning its willingness to take delivery. 130 
The corn, however, was never actually hauled to the elevator. In settiQg aside 
the seller's judgment, the court read U.C.C. section 2-301 in conjunction with 
U.C.C. section 2-503 and stated that "[a]ctual delivery, not mere present ability 
to fulfill all the conditions imposed on a tendering party, is necessary to 
constitute 'tender.' " 131 Then, in the very next sentence, an Iowa case is cited for 
the proposition that although actual delivery to the elevator may not be 
required, "mere inquiry" regarding delivery is not a tender. 132 The court does 
not say what more than mere inquiry is necessary. 
Long Island Lighting Co. v. Transamerica Delaval, /nc. 133 raised the question 
of whether tender occurs upon delivery or upon installation when the seller has 
responsibility for supervising the installation. The buyer purchased several 
emergency diesel generators for use in its nuclear power plant. The generators 
were delivered in 1976 but were not installed until 1981. It was during pre-
126. See U.C.C. §§ 2-301, 2-401(2), 2-507(1), 2-509, 2-725(2) for a sampling. 
127. The Code's basic prescription for "tender of delivery" is located in U.C.C. § 2-503. 
128. 223 Neb. 704, 393 N.W.2d 250, 2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1292 (1986). 
129. See U.C.C. § 2-301 ("The obligation of the seller is to transfer and deliver and that of the 
buyer is to accept and pay in accordance with the contract."). See also U.C.C. § 2-507( 1) ("Tender 
entitles the seller to acceptance of the goods and to payment according to the contract."). 
130. The seller testified that the buyer "refused to take my corn." 223 Neb. at 707, 393 N.W.2d 
at 253, 2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1295. 
131. 223 Neb. at 223, 393 N.W.2d at 256, 2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1300. The 
fact that the seller never tendered delivery does not mean that the buyer will prevail. If the seller's 
version of the facts is believed, tender would have been excused because of the buyer's repudiation of 
the contract. See U.C.C. § 2-610. Thus, the case was remanded for a new trial. 
132. The case cited in Sand Seed Serv. v. Bainbridge, 246 N.W.2d 911, 20 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
(Callaghan) 654 (Iowa 1976). The court described the holding as follows: "[A]lthough a seller may 
not be required to actually haul contracted grain to an elevator for an effective tender of delivery, 
mere inquiry regarding delivery does not satisfy tender of delivery .... " 
133. 646 F. Supp. 1442, 2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1333 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). 
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operational testing that cracks were discovered. The federal district court held 
that the goods were tendered when they were delivered and that the statute of 
limitations then began to run. 134 Interestingly, the court suggests a means for 
forestalling the delivery date. Perhaps a different result would have been 
achieved had the contract provided "that the goods be tested to assure confor-
mance with the contract before delivery was complete."135 
U.C.C. section 2-607(3)(a) poses a potential trap for any buyer seeking 
damages for breach after acceptance. Specifically, section 2-607(3)(a) requires a 
buyer to give the seller notice of any breach within a reasonable time after the 
buyer discovers or should have discovered the breach. One issue that continues 
to plague the courts is whether remote beneficiaries down the distributive chain 
from the actual buyer and remote manufacturers or distributors up the distribu-
tive chain from the immediate seller are subject to the burdens and benefits of 
the subsection. 
In Malawy v. Richards Manufacturing Co., 136 an Illinois court properly 
assumed that even a consumer buyer is obligated to notify remote manufacturers 
or distributors of any breach in order to impose liability up the distributive 
chain beyond the immediate seller. 137 That case involved an action for personal 
injuries arising out of a malfunctioning metal bone plate installed in the 
plaintiff's broken leg. The manufacturer of the plate first received notice more 
than three years after the plate had been removed from the plaintiff's leg. The 
court wisely concluded that because notice was given as soon as the plaintiff 
learned the actual manufacturer's identity, it was within a reasonable time as a 
matter of law. The plaintiff's immediate seller, the hospital, had received 
adequate notice of breach when its employees removed the plate after it broke. 
Following the U.S. Supreme Court's recent retreat from expanding notions of 
personal jurisdiction, 138 increased reliance on the common law concept of vouch-
ing-in now codified in U.C.C. section 2-607(5 )(a) is anticipated. The effect of 
that subsection is to bind the vouchee to facts determined in the prior proceed-
ing, provided they are common issues relevant to both determinations. 
Two cases make clear that compliance with section 2-607(5)(a) does not 
necessarily insure success. In the first case, Moldex, Inc. v. Ogden Engineering 
134. The court noted that "even tender of non conforming goods is considered delivery." 646 F. 
Supp. at 1455, 2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1337-38 (emphasis in original). 
135. 646 F. Supp. at 1455, 2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1337. 
136. 150 Ill. App. 3d 549, 501 N.E.2d 376, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 511 (1986), 
cert. denied, 114 Ill. 2d 547, 508 N.E.2d 729 (1987). 
137. Compare Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., 684 P.2d 187, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 
1150 (Colo. 1984), and Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co., 375 Mich. 85, 133 N.W.2d 129 (1965) 
(cases holding that notice to a remote seller is not required) with Morrow v. New Moon Homes, 
Inc., 548 P.2d 279, 19 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) (Alaska 1976); Western Equip. Co. v. 
Sheridan Iron Works, 605 P.2d 806, 28 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 356 (Wyo. 1980) (cases 
holding that notice is required). Much depends on whether the term "seller" in U.C.C. § 2-
607(3)(a) should be read as the "immediate seller." See also Me. Rev. S1at. Ann. tit. 11, § 2-607(7) 
(1964 & Supp. 1985) (notice requirement not applicable to personal injury); S.C. Code Ann.§ 36-
2-607(3)(a) ( 1976) (no notice requirement of personal injury to seller of consumer goods). 
138. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 107 S. Ct. 1026 (1987). 
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Corp., 139 the district court emphatically made the point that the first action is of 
no consequence unless it is "(a] full dress, good faith, adversary proceeding."140 
This was not the case where (i) both parties to the first action were controlled 
by the same individual, (ii) counsel for the voucher in the second suit was 
counsel for its adversary in the first, (iii) discovery in the first suit was not 
conscientious, and (iv) the findings of fact and conclusions of law adopted in the 
first suit were not the result of adversarial give and take. Furthermore, the court 
said that even if the issues litigated in the first action were binding on the 
vouchee in the second, the voucher would still have to establish that those 
decided issues established a right of indemnification. 141 
In the second case, Oates v. Diamond Shamrock Corp.,142 the Massachusetts 
Appellate Court reversed a decision of the trial court that had allowed the 
voucher to recover from the vouchee the costs incurred in its successful defense 
of the first action. The court ruled that compliance with section 2-607(5 )(a) does 
not answer "the threshold question whether the seller is 'answerable over' to the 
buyer."143 Absent a special relationship a retailer has no implied right of 
indemnification from a faultless manufacturer. 
RISK OF LOSS 
The most significant risk of loss case decided during the last reporting period 
was Commonwealth Propane Co. v. Petrosol International, Jnc. 144 The Sixth 
Circuit was called upon to sort out the rights of buyers and sellers of propane 
gas where the underground gas storage facility collapsed and the gas could no 
longer be removed. On November 5 and 18, Cal Gas Corporation ("Cal Gas") 
entered into separate contracts with Petrosol for the sale and delivery of 10,000 
barrels of liquid propane gas stored at Lake Underground Storage ("Lake 
Underground"), a storage facility in Ohio. Each contract required Cal Gas to 
deliver the propane on demand on or before March 31, 1983. Also on November 
5 and 18, Petrosol resold the propane to Commonwealth with delivery to occur 
on or before March 31, 1983. After each set of contracts, the same basic 
sequence of events followed. Petrosol sent Commonwealth a form entitled "Sales 
Acknowledgment," which Commonwealth accepted, and sent Cal Gas a form 
entitled "Purchase Acknowledgment," which Cal Gas accepted. 145 Common-
139. 652 F. Supp. 584, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 572 (D. Conn. 1987). For a 
discussion of the warranty aspects of this case, see supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text. 
140. 652 F. Supp. at 587-88, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 577. 
141. Id. at 588, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 578. Since the vouchee was never made a 
party to the first action, the "answerable over" issue could not, consistent with due process, be 
decided against it in that action. 
142. 23 Mass. App. Ct. 446, 503 N.E.2d 58, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 102 (1987). 
143. 503 N.E. 2d at 59, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 104. For this proposition, the 
court cites Comment, Voucher to Products Liability: The Mechanics of U.C.C. § 2-607(5)(a), 29 
Ark. L. Rev. 486, 495-98 (1976). 
144. 818 F.2d 522, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1778 (6th Cir. 1987). 
145. The court's casual use of the term "accepted" in its recitation of facts is unfortunate. If, as 
the court says, there was already a contract, what then was being accepted? Perhaps the court would 
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wealth then paid Petrosol for the propane, and Petrosol, in turn, paid Cal Gas. 
After receiving Petrosol's payment, Cal Gas sent a "Confirmation of Distribu-
tion" to both Lake Underground and Petrosol indicating a product flow from 
Cal Gas to Petrosol to Commonwealth and acknowledging delivery from Cal 
Gas to Petrosol. In February 1983, a wall in the cavern of Lake Underground 
collapsed and the propane was lost or destroyed. 146 
The Sixth Circuit first decided who bore the risk of loss as between Cal Gas 
and Petrosol. The district court had granted summary judgment to Petrosol 
based on what it perceived to be an agreement on risk allocation in the Purchase 
Acknowledgments. 147 In reaching its conclusion, the district court relied on a 
provision stating that title would pass to the buyer upon the occurrence of 
certain events, none of which had occurred. The court of appeals disagreed. It 
quite properly recognized that the location of title is no longer the determinant 
of risk allocation. 148 Hence, an agreement on title is not an agreement on risk of 
loss. Without a "contrary agreement" of the parties to guide it, the court next 
looked to the remainder of U.C.C. section 2-509 for an answer. 149 It agreed with 
Cal Gas that the propane was in the hands of a bailee and, as between Cal Gas 
and Petrosol, was to be delivered without being moved. The transactions, 
therefore, were governed by section 2-509(2). 160 But were the Confirmations of 
Distribution "written direction[s] to deliver"? The court said this did not need 
to be decided, since Petrosol had clearly accepted the tender of delivery when it 
resold the propane to Commonwealth. 151 The logic of the conclusion can be 
have been on firmer ground had it characterized the forms as "confirmations" and stated that what 
was being accepted were "proposals for addition to the contract." U.C.C. § 2-207(2). 
146. During the period in question, Commonwealth also purchased propane stored at Lake 
Underground from parties other than Petrosol. After the collapse, Commonwealth apparently was 
able to salvage some propane, none of which it allocated to its contract with Petrosol. If it is 
ultimately decided that, as between Petrosol and Commonwealth, the former bore the risk of loss, 
the question of whether Commonwealth is free to allocate the retrieved propane in any manner it 
chooses will have to be decided. See 818 F.2d at 530-31, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 
1790. The issue is an interesting twist on the seller's duty to allocate production and deliveries under 
u.c.c. § 2-615(b). 
147. Both the district court and the court of appeals assumed that the terms of the purchase and 
the sales acknowledgments were binding on the recipient. This assumption might be correct, but it is 
far from obvious. See supra note 145. See also U.C.C. § 2-207. 
148. The demise of title was an integral part of Llewellyn's plan to rationalize and modernize 
commercial law. Its unimportance is a theme the Code's drafters thought worthy of repetition. See 
U.C.C. §§ 2-101 comment, 2-401 & comment 1, 2-505 comment 1, 2-706 comments 3 & 11, 9-101 
comment, 9-202 & comment, 9-311 comment 2. 
149. Resort to the provisions of U.C.C. § 2-509 becomes necessary only in the absence of an 
agreement on risk of loss. See U.C.C. § 2-509(4). 
150. Under U.C.C. § 2-509(2)(c), risk of loss passes to the buyer when the buyer receives a 
"non-negotiable document of title or other written direction to deliver, as provided in subsection 
(4)(b) of Section 2-503." This latter section provides that "tender to the buyer of a non-negotiable 
document of title or of a written direction to the bailee to deliver is sufficient tender unless the buyer 
seasonably objects .... " U.C.C. § 2-503(4)(b). 
151. Acceptance of goods occurs when the buyer "does any act inconsistent with the seller's 
ownership." U.C.C. § 2-606( 1 )(c). 
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faulted on two counts. First, unless the buyer has received a written direction to 
the bailee to deliver the goods, no tender has taken place and no reason for a 
seasonable objection by the buyer exists. Second, it is difficult to envision how a 
contract to resell is inconsistent with the ownership interest of Cal Gas. This is 
no more than an effort to realize the economic value of a contractual expecta-
tion. In any event, the court ruled that, as between Cal Gas and Petrosol, the 
risk of loss was on Petrosol. 
The Sixth Circuit then considered the contracts between Petrosol and Com-
monwealth. The district court found that the Sales Acknowledgments also 
contained a "contrary agreement" within the meaning of U.C.C. section 2-
509( 4) that shifted the risk of loss to Petrosol. Indeed, the acknowledgments 
specifically covered risk of loss. Each unambiguously stated that the risk shifted 
to the buyer when the propane was delivered according to the method stipulated 
on the face of the acknowledgment. The problem was that, although different 
types of delivery methods were listed on the forms, there was no indication 
which method, if any, the parties had agreed upon. Consequently, there was no 
way to know from the acknowledgments whether the parties contemplated the 
movement of the propane as part of its delivery. In light of this unresolved 
factual issue, the appellate court held that the district court's entry of summary 
judgment was improper. 152 
Despite its order of remand, the court responded to several points raised by 
Commonwealth relative to the application of section 2-509(2). It rejected as 
untenable Commonwealth's contentions that (i) to be effective, "written direc-
tion to deliver" must come from the immediate seller-in this case Petrosol;153 
(ii) since the delivery period ran until March 31, 1983, its time for "seasonably 
objecting" to the tender also ran to that date;154 and (iii) the bailee's need 
eventually to lift the propane from the underground cavern to a surface loading 
platform is sufficient movement to render section 2-509(2) inapplicable. 155 
REPUDIATION 
Courts continue to grapple with the diverse time-reference issues lurking in 
U.C.C. section 2-610. The issue this year involved the running of a contractual 
limitations period for commencing suit. In American Cyanamid Co. v. Missis-
sippi Chemical Corp., 156 MCC contracted with Cyanamid for the installment 
purchase of phosphate rock to be used in the production of fertilizer. The 
contract provided a one-year statute of limitations. Because of a downturn in the 
farm economy, MCC did not require as much phosphate rock as it first thought 
152. Curiously, the court never mentioned excuse under U.C.C. § 2-613, maybe because it was 
never raised by Petrosol. Under that section, Petrosol's performance would be excused if it bore the 
risk of loss. 
153. Commonwealth Propane Co. v. Petrosol Int'!, Inc., 818 F.2d 522, 529, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
2d (Callaghan) 1778, 1787-88 (6th Cir. 1987). 
154. Id. at 530, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1788. 
155. Id. at 530, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1788-89. 
156. 817 F.2d 91, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1411 (1 lth Cir. 1987). 
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it might need. Accordingly, on September 3, 1982, MCC wrote to Cyanamid 
that only "forty-five percent of the quantity of phosphate rock previously 
budgeted" was needed. Again, on December 22, 1982, MCC wrote that "we 
simply cannot purchase from American Cyanamid any more phosphate rock 
than that expressed in my letter of September 3, 1982." On March 2, 1984, 
Cyanamid brought suit to recover damages for MCC's breach of contract. 157 
The district court granted summary judgment to MCC on the ground that the 
suit was barred by the contractual statute of limitations. The court was of the 
opinion that Cyanamid's cause of action for breach accrued not later than 
December 22, 1982, when MCC repudiated the contract. 
The Eleventh Circuit, applying New Jersey law, affirmed. Its reasoning was 
straightforward and simple. Under New Jersey law, a cause of action accrues 
and the statute of limitations begins to run the moment the right to sue arises. 
Under U.C.C. section 2-610, the aggrieved party has the right to sue the 
repudiating party immediately. Thus, the limitations period began to run when 
the contract was repudiated by MCC. 158 Regrettably, the issue was not so 
straightforward and simple. The aggrieved party's option under section 2-610 to 
await and even encourage performance by the repudiating party is the compli-
cating factor. The Eleventh Circuit found that this provision does no more than 
"overturn the harsh common law rule that one who urged the other party to 
perform after repudiation forever lost his right to complain of the repudia-
tion."159 But should not the right to await performance and not treat the 
repudiation as final be exercisable without that right being compromised? 160 
Also, the Eleventh Circuit says nothing of the other contexts in which similar 
issues involving section 2-610 have arisen. For example, does it make sense to 
hold that the limitations period begins to run on the repudiation date but that 
some other date is more appropriate as the breach date for purposes of U.C.C. 
157. Cyanamid's position was that, because performance of the contract was to extend into mid-
1983, its suit was timely since it was brought within one year of the end of the contract's term. 
158. The court still had to address the fact that the contract was an installment contract. 
Although the two letters sent by MCC amounted to a breach, were they a breach of the whole 
contract? The Eleventh Circuit thought that "New Jersey courts would hold that the anticipatory 
breach of an installment contract creates a single unitary cause of action, at least unless the parties 
have mutually agreed that a severable cause of action arises for each defaulted installment." 8 I 7 
F.2d at 94, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1415. One subcommittee member who 
commented on the case suggested that although U.C.C. § 2-612(3) does not apply to this case, it 
could have been applied by analogy. If so, the anticipatory repudiation that would substantially 
impair the value of the whole contract would be a breach of the whole contract. 
159. 817 F.2d at 94, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1414. 
160. If the aggrieved party elects to forestall a breach but the limitations period has nevertheless 
begun to run, the actual time period from breach to bar would be effectively less than it would 
otherwise be if the repudiation had been treated as an immediate breach. 
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section 2-713? 161 If not, the court should have said why the repudiation date is 
the date on which to measure an aggrieved buyer's damages. 162 
The Eighth Circuit entered the fray in Gibbs, Nathaniel (Canada) Ltd. v. 
International Multifoods Corp. 163 A seller of peanuts was to guarantee that the 
peanuts would pass inspection by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration 
("FDA") and was to have the "option of Blanching/Reconditioning/Replacing 
any quantity which fail[ed] initial entry but [was) not bound to do so." On 
June 3, 1981, when 330,690 pounds of peanuts failed inspection, the buyer 
informed the seller by letter that it was cancelling the contract. In July, the 
buyer had a change of heart and agreed to accept 66,965 pounds of substitute 
peanuts and to accept the peanuts rejected by the FDA if they could be 
reconditioned so as to pass inspection by July 25, 1981. The seller tried, but 
again the peanuts failed. By letter dated August 21, 1981, the buyer reminded 
the seller that it had cancelled the contract on June 3 and, therefore, had no 
obligation to accept further shipment. The peanuts finally passed inspection on 
October 16, 1981, but the buyer rejected their tender as untimely and the seller 
brought suit. 
The Eighth Circuit concluded that the buyer's letter of June 3 constituted a 
repudiation but its later willingness to accept substitute and reconditioned 
peanuts which passed FDA inspection by July 25 constituted an effective 
retraction under U.C.C. section 2-611. It was the seller not the buyer who was 
in breach, said the court. The seller's breach occurred on July 25, when it failed 
to tender conforming peanuts. The outcome would have been the same even if 
the buyer had not retracted its repudiation. To collect damages for an anticipa-
tory breach, an aggrieved party must show that it would have been capable of 
performing when the time for performance came. 164 This the seller could not do. 
The term "repudiation" was left undefined by the drafters of the U.C.C. The 
official comment to section 2-610 that "an anticipatory repudiation centers upon 
an overt communication of intention or an action which renders performance 
impossible or demonstrates a clear determination not to continue with perfor-
mance" is commonly accepted starting point for analysis. The problem is that 
manifestations of intention by words or other conduct often lack such a degree of 
clarity. It is, therefore, left for the courts to decide these matters on a case by 
case basis. In Gatoil (U.S.A.), Inc. v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit 
Authority, 165 the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the 
seller's communications to the buyer detailing its difficulties in obtaining a 
161. See Comment, Anticipatory Repudiation Under the Uniform Commercial Code: An Exami-
nation of the Measurement of a Buyer's Damages, 21 Haus. L. Rev. 505 ( 1984 ), for an overview of 
this topic. 
162. If the court meant to imply that the breach date should be the same regardless of the 
context, its opinion is unpersuasive without consideration of the other contexts. 
163. 804 F.2d 450, 2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1312 (8th Cir. 1986). 
164. As the court put it, "The rationale is that if the nonbreaching party could not have 
performed, no repudiation would 'substantially impair the value of the contract' under [U.C.C. § 2-
610]." Id. at 453, 2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1316. 
165. 801F.2d451, 2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 151 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
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source of fuel from which to supply the buyer did not permit a finding that the 
seller had "unequivocally and positively"166 repudiated the contract. The sub-
stance of what the buyer was told was that the seller was having trouble 
obtaining fuel, that it would be unable to begin deliveries on July 1 as had 
previously been agreed, and that it was seeking alternative sources of supply and 
hoped to secure one by July 5. 167 
REMEDIES 
Rejection and Revocation of Acceptance 
Aubrey's R. V. Center v. Tandy Corp. 168 involved an attempted "rescission" of 
a contract for the purchase of a computer system. Aubrey's contacted Radio 
Shack Computer Center ("Radio Shack") about purchasing a system capable of 
performing a number of designated functions. They agreed that Tandy, Radio 
Shack's parent company, would supply the hardware and most of the software 
and that the purchaser would be Dolsen Leasing Company ("Dolsen"), which 
would lease the system to Aubrey's. Aubrey's encountered problems with two of 
the programs immediately after the computer was installed. For approximately 
nine months thereafter, Tandy repeatedly tried, without success, to solve the 
various problems. Aubrey's eventually sent a letter to Tandy asking for rescis-
sion of the contract and return of the purchase price. Tandy responded with 
several more futile attempts to straighten things out. When Tandy finally gave 
up, Aubrey's filed suit. The trial judge ordered the contract rescinded and 
awarded Aubrey's damages. 
On appeal, the Washington Court of Appeals affirmed. The court saw no 
harm in Aubrey's request for rescission, now more properly called "revocation 
of acceptance." 169 To withhold the latter remedy only because the term rescis-
sion was used, would be, in the court's view, "excessively technical and overly 
formalistic." 170 The reasonableness of Aubrey's notice of revocation, 171 which 
came approximately nine months after delivery, was still left for decision. The 
court held that the time frame was reasonable; Tandy's repeated assurances that 
166. 801 F.2d at 457, 2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 159. 
167. If in doubt whether a communication rises to the level of a repudiation, the aggrieved party 
may have the option of demanding adequate assurance of performance under U.C.C. § 2-610. If the 
demand is rightful, the failure to provide assurance is a repudiation. U.C.C. § 2-610(4). 
168. 46 Wash. App. 595, 731 P.2d 1124, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 105 (1987). 
169. The right of the buyer to revoke its acceptance is governed by U.C.C. § 2-608. Though the 
court is correct in its characterization of "revocation of acceptance" as the Code name for the 
common law remedy of rescission, there is still life after the Code for an independent common law 
remedy of rescission. U.C.C. § 2-608 is predicated on the seller's breach, but at times the remedy of 
rescission is appropriate where there is no breach, e.g., mutual mistake. The non-Code remedy then 
enters the case via U.C.C. § 1-103. 
170. 46 Wash. App. at 601, 731 P.2d at 1128, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 111. 
171. On the subject of notice, buyers should be reminded that notifying the seller of defects is not 
enough. To be sufficient, the seller must be told of the buyer's intention to revoke. Unfortunately, 
this was a lesson the buyer learned too late in C.R. Daniels, Inc. v. Yazoo Mfg. Co., 641 F. Supp. 
205, 2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 481 (S.D. Miss. 1986). 
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the problems would be cured worked to extend the period for revocation of 
acceptance. 172 But according to Tandy, even if the notice was timely, Aubrey's 
waived revocation of acceptance by continuing to use some of the software after 
sending the letter of revocation. The court disagreed. Whether continued use of 
the goods vitiates the revocation depends on the reasonableness of that use. 
Applying a five-factor test to the facts, 173 the court concluded that Aubrey's 
continued use of the system was not inconsistent with its revocation. 174 
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the case was the one that got away. No 
one seemed to question the propriety of Tandy as the defendant, even though at 
least formally Dolsen was the purchaser and Aubrey's its lessee. 175 Even 
assuming that the lease was in fact a disguised sale, making Aubrey's a "buyer" 
and allowing it to exercise the remedy of revocation of acceptance against Tandy 
totally disregards the actual transfer of title from Tandy to Dolsen.176 This, 
~owever, is just what the Third Circuit Court of Appeals did in General 
Electric Credit Corp. of Tennessee v. Ger-Beck Machine Co. 177 
In Ger-Beck, the issue was whether a party who finances a three-way 
equipment lease-purchase transaction may be treated as a seller for the purpose 
of a revocation of acceptance. The jury, on special interrogatories, found that the 
172. Similar reasoning can be found in other cases decided during this reporting period. See 
Sierra Diesel Injection Serv. v. Burroughs Corp., 651 F. Supp. 1371, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 
(Callaghan) 538 (D. Nev. 1987) (because of repeated assurances, revocation six years after delivery 
was reasonable); Alpert v. Thomas, 643 F. Supp. 1406, 2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 99 (D. 
Vt. 1986) (because of repeated assurances, revocation one year after delivery was reasonable). 
173. In this regard, the court borrowed from McCullough v. Bill Swad Chrysler-Plymouth, 5 
Ohio St. 3d 1181, 449 N.E.2d 1289, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 513 (1983). According to 
McCullough, the reasonableness of post-revocation use depends on the answers to the following five 
questions: 
( 1) Upon being apprised of the buyer's revocation of his acceptance, what instructions, if any 
did the seller tender the buyer concerning return of the now rejected goods? (2) Did the buyer's 
business needs or personal circumstances compel the continued use? (3) During the period of 
such use, did the seller persist in assuring the buyer that all nonconformities would be cured or 
that provisions would otherwise be made to recompense the latter for the dissatisfaction and 
inconvenience which the defects caused him? (4) Did the seller act in good faith? (5) Was the 
seller unduly prejudiced by the buyer's continued use? 
Id. at 1184, 449 N.E.2d at 1293, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 518-19. 
174. The court did, however, make the needless point that "retention and continued use beyond 
the time this judgment is satisfied is unacceptable." Aubrey's R.V. Center, Inc. v. Tandy Corp., 46 
Wash. App. 595, 605, 731 P.2d 1124, 1130, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 105, 114 (1987). 
The point was needless because revocation requires that the goods be returned or at least tendered to 
the seller. See U.C.C. §§ 2-602(2)(b), (c), 2-608(3). 
175. In addition to the actual purchase price of the computer, Aubrey's was awarded as 
consequential damages the finance charges it incurred to Dolsen. 
176. The majority rule is that revocation of acceptance is a remedy available to the buyer only 
against his immediate seller. See, e.g., Seekings v. Jimmy GMC of Tucson, Inc., 638 P.2d 210, 32 
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1450 (Ariz. 1981); Edelstein v. Toyota Motors Distrib., 176 N.J. 
Super. 57, 422 A.2d 101, 30 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 992 (1980); Gasque v. Mooers Motor 
Car Co., 313 S.E.2d 384, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 120 (Va. 1984). 
177. 806 F.2d 1207, 2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 769 (3d Cir. 1986). 
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transaction between the manufacturer of a lathe and GECC was a true sale and 
that the purported lease transaction between GECC and Ger-Beck was also a 
true sale in which the lease was intended to provide only a security interest. 
Notwithstanding a formal seller-buyer relationship between GECC and Ger-
Beck, the trial court ruled that article 2 did not apply to the transaction as a 
matter of law and, therefore, revocation of acceptance was not an available 
remedy against GECC. 
The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that where the lessor provided nothing 
except the money to finance the ultimate passage of title from the manufacturer 
to a nominal lessee, its status is, as a matter of law, solely that of a financer. 
Consequently, the transaction between GECC and Ger-Beck was, as a matter 
of law, intended only as a security transaction to which, by its terms, the 
remedial provisions of article 2 do not apply. 178 One judge dissented, noting that 
the article " 'covers actual sales transactions in which the seller retains a 
security interest, since the section excludes those transactions which are in-
tended to operate only as security transactions.' " 179 Judge Becker felt that to 
give conclusive weight to the nature of GECC's business as financer and to 
ignore the reality of how the transaction was actually structured is to be ruled 
by " 'the tyranny of labels.' " 180 It seems that new article 2A of the U.C.C. offers 
little guidance on the issue raised in Ger-Beck and the one not raised in Tandy 
Corp. If a transaction labelled a lease is actually a sale, then article 2A does not 
apply and cases like these are outside its intended scope. 181 In fact, the drafters 
of article 2A have explicitly not taken a stand on the correctness of Ger-Beck. ' 82 
That nontraditional transactions have made traditional modes of analysis un-
workable is becoming increasingly apparent. What were once functional catego-
ries are now suspect labels. Judge Becker's "tyranny" admonition should be 
kept in mind. 
178. U.C.C. § 2-102 excludes from the scope of article 2 any transaction that is intended "to 
operate only as a security transaction." Anticipating how the New Jersey Supreme Court would 
rule on the issue, the court gave significant weight to the lower court case of Miller Auto Leasing 
Co. v. Weinstein, 189 N.J. Super. 543, 461 A.2d 174 (Law Div. 1983), a.IJ'd per curiam, 193 N.J. 
Super. 328, 473 A.2d 996 (App. Div. 1984), cert. denied, 97 N.J. 676, 483 A.2d 192 (1984). That 
case held that a party in the position of G ECC was not a "seller" for purposes of article 2 
warranties. In a dissenting opinion, Judge Becker asserted that "even where warranties cannot be 
implied, the separate Article Two remedy of revocation of acceptance is available .... " 806 F.2d at 
1211, 2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 775 (Becker, C.J., dissenting). But without any 
implied warranties, there could be no breach by GECC. If no breach, why would Ger-Beck be 
afforded a remedy? 
179. 806 F.2d at 1213, 2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 777 (citing N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§ 12A:2-102 New Jersey Study comment 2). 
180. 806 F.2d at 1217, 2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 783 (citing Snyder v. Massachu-
setts, 291 U.S. 97, 114 (1934)). 
181. See U.C.C. § 2A-102 ("This article applies to any transaction, regardless of form, that 
creates a lease."). 
182. See U.C.C. § 2A-516 comment. 
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Courts continue to struggle with the application of U.C.C. provisions to used 
goods. In Web Press Services Corp. v. New London Motors, 183 the Connecticut 
Supreme Court held that section 2-608 applies to the sale of used vehicles. 
Moreover, the standard for substantial impairment is no different from the 
standard two-pronged test applicable to new vehicles. The focus is first on the 
needs and circumstances of the particular buyer ("subjective"), then on whether 
the value of the goods to the buyer has in fact been impaired ("objective"). It is 
difficult to fault the court for adopting a test consisting of an objective/subjective 
mix. To ignore the objective is to accept the unlikely proposition that the trier of 
fact can decide the truth of subjective assertions divorced from objective percep-
tions of reasonableness. 
A final case meriting brief comment is Alpert v. Thomas. 184 The court's 
erroneous conclusion that once a buyer is found to have properly revoked its 
acceptance the burden of proof shifts from the buyer to the seller is noteworthy. 
This requires the seller to prove that the goods and their tender were con-
forming. Not only would this approach permit an inefficient relitigation of an 
issue already decided, 185 but it is inconsistent with the rationale underlying 
U.C.C. section 2-607( 4 ). 186 The burden of proving a nonconforming tender 
shifts to the buyer upon acceptance only because claims of breach in connection 
with accepted goods are often made long after delivery, increasing the possibility 
that the defect was a consequence of the buyer's misuse, abuse, or neglect of the 
goods. Conversely, the burden remains with the seller if the goods have been 
rejected, as it is less likely that the buyer has had sufficient time to cause any 
provable defect. Consistency with this scheme mandates that the burden of proof 
following revocation of acceptance should remain with the buyer. It is doubtful 
whether the post-acceptance concerns reflected by U.C.C. section 2-607( 4) are 
in any way diminished by the act of revocation. 
RECLAMATION 
Although the traditional heading of this section remains unchanged, the one 
case mentioned this year is only incidentally a reclamation case. It speaks 
primarily to the seller's right to stop the shipment of goods in transit pursuant to 
U.C.C. section 2-705. 187 
In In re Pester Refining Co., 188 the debtor-in-possession, Pester, operated a 
refinery and on numerous occasions purchased natural gas products from Burke 
Energy Corporation ("Burke") and MAPCO Gas Products, Inc. ("MAPCO"). 
183. 203 Conn. 342, 525 A.2d 57, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1386 (1987). 
184. 643 F. Supp. 1406, 2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 99 (D. Vt. 1986). 
185. Was not the conformity of the tender already decided when the propriety of the revocation 
was decided? 
186. U.C.C. § 2-607( 4) reads: "The burden is on the buyer to establish any breach with respect 
to the goods accepted." See generally R. Nordstrom, Law of Sales§ 142 (1970). 
187. U.C.C. § 2-705(1) provides in part: "The seller may stop delivery of goods in the 
possession of a carrier or other bailee when he discovers the buyer to be insolvent." 
188. 66 Bankr. 801, 2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 501 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1986). 
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The three used a pipeline operated by Mid-America Pipeline Company ("Mid-
America") for their transactions. Burke and MAPCO would ship their products 
to a major station in the Mid-America pipeline system designated as Group 
140. There, Pester and the seller would execute a product transfer order 
("PTO") directing Mid-America to transfer title of a specified amount of 
product from the seller to Pester. What occurred afterwards followed no set 
pattern. Sometimes Pester would have the gas transferred to another location; 
sometimes it would remain stored at Group 140. When Pester filed a voluntary 
chapter 11 petition in bankruptcy, Burke and MAPCO directed Mid-America 
to stop the shipment of gas products in transit to Pester and to deliver the 
products to them. Accordingly, Mid-America transferred out of Pester's account 
the products stored at Group 140 traceable to sales from Burke and MAPCO. 
Whether Pester could be deprived of the gas depended upon the timeliness of 
the stoppage;189 bankruptcy judge Stageman ruled that it came too late. U.C.C. 
section 2-705(2) sets forth a laundry list of events that will cut off the right to 
stop delivery. 190 The events enumerated in subparagraphs (b) and (d) of that 
subsection were easy to dispose of; clearly neither had occurred. 191 Subpara-
graph (a) was a bit more difficult to deal with. Pester argued that it had received 
the product because the delivery obligations of Burke and MAPCO had been 
performed. The court disagreed. Receipt requires physical possession, and 
Pester will not have possession until the gas passes through Pester's meter at its 
refinery. 192 Subparagraph (c) was the last on the list for consideration. Mid-
America gave the required acknowledgment when it processed the PTO forms 
and sent confirmations to Pester showing the change in inventory, and Judge 
189. If untimely, the gas would have become property of the bankruptcy estate under 11 U.S.C. 
§ 541(a)(1) (1982) and would have to be turned over to Pester pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 542(a) 
(1982). On the other hand, if the right to stop delivery was properly exercised, the estate could gain 
possession of the gas only if the contracts were assumed under 11U.S.C.§365(b) (1982). 
190. U.C.C. § 2-705(2) reads: 
(2) As against such buyer the seller may stop delivery until 
(a) receipt of the goods by the buyer; or 
(b) acknowledgment to the buyer by any bailee of the goods except a carrier that the bailee 
holds the goods for the buyer; or 
(c) such acknowledgment to the buyer by a carrier by reshipment or as warehouseman; or 
(d) negotiation to the buyer of any negotiable document of title covering the goods. 
191. Mid-America was a carrier, not just a bailee, and no negotiable document covering the 
goods had been issued. 
192. See U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(c) ("'Receipt' of goods means taking physical possession of them."). 
The court rejected the holding of Warrior Tombigbee Transp. Co. v. 5,775.674 Net Tons of Coal, 
570 F. Supp. 1405, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 90 (S.D. Ala. 1983), that arrival of goods at 
the F.O.B. location completes delivery and cuts off a seller's U.C.C. § 2-705 rights. 
One curious aspect of the opinion is the court's decision that MAPCO's demand for reclamation 
under U.C.C. § 2-702(2) had also come too late. After making the point that receipt requires 
possession, the court adds without explanation, "Receipt of the goods, within the meaning of U.C.C. 
§ 2-702(2), occurred when the seller's right to stop the goods in transit were cut off under U.C.C. 
§ 2-705(2)(c)." 66 Bankr. at 814, 2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 518. 
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Stageman held it acknowledged "as warehouseman."193 Once the gas arrived at 
Group 140, Mid-America was acting in a capacity distinct from its original role 
as carrier. The reasons: (i) the gas had reached its final destination under the 
original shipment contracts, (ii) no freight charges had to be paid before Pester 
could assert control over the gas, and (iii) Pester could store the gas at Group 
140 as long as it wanted. 
BUYER'S MONEY REMEDIES AND THEIR 
LIMIT AT IONS 
This survey more than once makes the point that courts should be sensitive to 
the risk that the unthinking application of U.C.C. remedies will produce a 
"windfall" or "double benefit" to the aggrieved party. 194 Unfortunately, this 
point was lost on the New York Court of Appeals in Fertico Belgium S.A. v. 
Phosphate Chemicals Export Association. 195 
Fertico contracted with Phosphate to purchase two separate shipments of 
fertilizer for resale to Altaweed, Iraq's agricultural ministry. When Fertico 
learned that both shipments would be delivered late, it immediately covered so 
as to avoid a breach of its contract with Altaweed. On the same day Fertico 
acquired cover, its president renegotiated its contract with Altaweed. In return 
for a postponed delivery date and an additional payment of $20.50 per ton, 
Fertico agreed to make direct inland delivery rather than delivery to the seaport 
of Basra. Notwithstanding Phosphate's late delivery of the first shipment and 
the intervening cover, Fertico felt compelled to accept the renegotiations196 
because Phosphate had successfully drawn on Fertico's $1.7 million letter of 
credit. This shipment was later resold at a profit of $454,000. 
The first issue concerned the increased costs Fertico incurred in performing 
the Altaweed contract. Rather than delivering at seaport as originally intended, 
it was forced to deliver inland because of the delay caused by Phosphate's 
breach. Although an additional expense of this type would ordinarily constitute 
a recoverable item of consequential damages,197 the court correctly denied its 
recovery because Altaweed compensated Fertico for the additional costs, thus 
insulating it from any loss. The appellate division held, however, that the 
$20.50 per ton additional reimbursement that Fertico obtained from Altaweed 
was an expense saved as a consequence of Phosphate's breach. 198 The Court of 
193. See U.C.C. § 2-705 comment 3 ("Acknowledgment by the carrier as a 'warehouseman' 
within the meaning or this article requires a contract or a truly different character from the original 
shipment, a contract not in extension or transit but as a warehouseman."). 
194. See infra text accompanying notes 230-36. 
195. 70 N.Y.2d 76, 510 N.E.2d 334, 517 N.Y.S.2d 465, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 
1812 (1987). 
196. The second shipment was never tendered because Fertico cancelled before the shipment 
was loaded for delivery. 
197. See U.C.C. § 2-715(2). 
198. Hit were, Phosphate would be entitled to have its liability reduced accordingly. See U.C.C. 
§ 2-712(2). 
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Appeals disagreed. The expense would not have been incurred in the absence of 
a breach; it was no more than compensation for the additional shipment 
responsibilities incurred by Fertico. 
The next issue in Phosphate Chemicals concerned the correctness of the 
appellate division's decision to reduce Fertico's damages by the profit it obtained 
on the resale of Phosphate's first and only shipment of fertilizer. The Court of 
Appeals ruled that the offset was improper. Under the "exceptional"199 circum-
stances, Fertico had the right to cover even in the face of accepting late delivery 
of a portion of the fertilizer. To then reduce its "cover" damages by the profit 
earned on the resale of Phosphate's fertilizer would be to deprive it of a profit it 
would have otherwise earned. Without Phosphate's fertilizer on hand, the sale 
would have been made anyway; Fertico could always have obtained what it 
needed from the marketplace. The dissent argued that a buyer cannot both sue 
for cover and accept the goods. By claiming "cover" damages, Fertico had 
therefore impliedly rejected the fertilizer and consequently held it only as 
security for the payments made to Phosphate.200 Its later sale, therefore, was for 
Phosphate's account. To hold otherwise would allow Fertico to "benefit twice 
from what was a single bargain-a result that is unacceptable under U.C.C. 
§ 1-106."201 
Both the majority and dissenting opinions seem a bit wide of the mark. First, 
there is nothing inherently improper in permitting the recovery of cover dam-
ages when the goods have been accepted. If Fertico had not covered when it did, 
Phosphate would have had to compensate it for the entire profit lost on its 
contract with Altaweed. In effect, cover damages in this case represent no more 
than a portion of that profit lost because of an increase in the acquisition cost of 
the fertilizer sold to Altaweed. First, the majority erred in blindly accepting the 
fact that Fertico would have made the sale even without Phosphate's fertil-
izer.202 Second, assuming that sale could have been made, the profit received 
would depend on the then market price of fertilizer. 203 In a rising market, to give 
Fertico the full profit on the sale of the fertilizer purchased from Phosphate is, 
indeed, to give it more than it would have earned from full performance of the 
Phosphate contract. 
In the non-U.C.C. case of Barco Auto Leasing Corp. v. House, 204 the 
Connecticut Supreme Court nevertheless decided a U.C.C. issue of some impor-
tance. The buyers sought rescission of an installment sales contract for an 
199. 70 N.Y.2d at 82-83, 510 N.E.2d at 337, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 468-69, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 
(Callaghan) at 1817. The court is probably correct in its assessment of the unexceptional case as one 
where cover is obtained because the promised delivery is never made. 
200. See U.C.C. § 2-711(3). 
201. 70 N.Y.2d at 87, 510 N.E.2d at 340, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 471, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 
(Callaghan) at 1820 (Titone, J., dissenting). 
202. There was no evidence of the market supply of fertilizer. 70 N.Y.2d at 88, 510 N.E.2d at 
341, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 472, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1821. 
203. There was no evidence of the market price at the time Fertico would have gone into the 
market to acquire additional fertilizer. Id. 
204. 202 Conn. 106, 520 A.2d 162, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 122 (1987). 
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automobile, alleging numerous violations of the state Retail Installment Sales 
Financing Act ("RISFA").205 The trial court found that the seller had violated 
RISF A and ruled that the buyers were entitled to rescind the contract and to 
recover as damages the payments made to the seller without having to account 
for the substantial use value of the automobile prior to its return to the seller. 206 
The supreme court affirmed. Noting that the U.C.C. was inapplicable, the court 
then looked to the U.C.C. as an appropriate model by which to adjudge the 
proper remedy under RISF A. The analysis consisted of little more than com-
paring U.C.C. section 2-711(1)207 with U.C.C. section 2-718(3).208 Because the 
former makes no mention of an offset for the buyer's use of the defective good 
and the latter does, the court concluded that a seller must "return the buyer's 
purchase price in toto when he has delivered non-conforming goods under 
circumstances that afford a buyer a right to reject or to revoke acceptance."209 
Without elaboration, the court stated in a footnote "that certain circumstances 
may compel the award of such an offset to the seller."210 Time will tell what 
those circumstances might be. 
The Supreme Court of New Jersey decided a remedial issue of importance in 
Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Master Engraving Co. 211 The issue, which has 
occasioned considerable case law and commentary, was whether a contractual 
exclusion of consequential damages will survive the failure of the buyer's 
contractually limited remedy to achieve its essential purpose. 212 Kearney in-
volved a contract for a computer-controlled machine tool that, according to the 
buyer's evidence, was inoperable twenty-five to fifty percent of the time during 
its first year of use despite repeated attempts by the seller to correct the defects. 
The buyer sought damages for lost profits on customer orders allegedly unfilled 
205. See Conn. Gen. Stat.§§ 42-83 through 42-lOOa (1987). The violations had nothing to do 
with the quality of the automobile but, rather, involved the content of the documentation. 
206. According to the evidence, the buyers drove the automobile approximately 65,000 miles. 
There was testimony that this use had a value of $16,150. 
207. Under U.C.C. § 2-711( 1 ), a buyer who "rightfully rejects or justifiably revokes acceptance" 
is entitled to recover "so much of the price as has been paid." 
208. U.C.C. § 2-718(3), which pertains to a defaulting buyer's right of restitution, expressly 
provides for the right to an offset for "the amount or value of any benefits received by the buyer 
directly or indirectly by reason of the contract." 
209. 202 Conn. at 115, 520 A.2d at 167, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 128. The court 
did recognize that there is case law supporting an offset for use. However, the court thought these 
cases unpersuasive because either they involved the buyer's use following revocation of acceptance or 
they failed to take into account U.C.C. § 2-718(3). 
210. 202 Conn. at 116 n.5, 520 A.2d at 167 n.5, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 129 n.5. 
21 l. 107 N.J. 584, 527 A.2d 429, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1684 (N.J. 1987). 
212. Compare, e.g., R.W. Murray Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 758 F.2d 266, 40 U.C.C. 
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1283 (8th Cir. 1985), and Koehring Co. v. A.P.I., Inc., 369 F. Supp. 882, 
14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 368 (E.D. Mich 1974) (cases that have held that the exclusion of 
consequential damages is also vitiated by a failure of a limited remedy clause) with Kaplan v. RCA 
Corp., 783 F.2d 463, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1312 (4th Cir. 1986), and Lewis 
Refrigeration Co. v. Sawyer Fruit, Vegetable & Cold Storage Co., 709 F.2d 427, 36 U.C.C. Rep. 
Serv. (Callaghan) 170 (6th Cir. 1983) (cases that have held that the exclusion of consequential 
damages is not vitiated). 
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because the machine was inoperable. Both the trial court and the appellate 
division allowed recovery notwithstanding the parties' specific agreement to 
preclude recovery of consequential damages. The courts reasoned that "the 
allocation of risk through exclusion of consequential damages was inextricably 
tied to the limitation of remedies."213 Because the jury had found that the repair 
and replacement warranty failed of its essential purpose, the damages exclusion 
was also rendered unenforceable. 
The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed. It was greatly influenced by what 
it perceived as two of the pillars of policy on which the remedial structure of the 
U.C.C. was built: freedom of contract214 and the availability of minimum 
adequate remedies.215 Only a validation of the exclusion of consequential dam-
ages would give due recognition to both. A "beneficial risk-allocation device" 
agreed to by both parties would be given effect and the buyer would be provided . 
a "fair quantum of remedy." The presumption that in most cases enforcement 
of the contractual ban on recovering consequentials would be consistent with the 
intent and expectation of the parties was central to the supreme court's conclu-
sion.216 But if the purpose of the limited remedy was to provide the buyer with 
workable goods, denying consequentials when the goods remained unworkable 
would run counter to the parties' intent. One could just as easily surmise that 
the parties intended to insulate the seller from liability for damages suffered 
during a reasonable repair period and thereafter, if in fact the goods were 
repaired or replaced. Instead, the court suggests the parties intended to preclude 
the recovery of consequentials occasioned by the seller's failure to repair or 
replace. 
Section 2-718(1) defines when a liquidated damage term is enforceable. 
Section 2-718(1) specifies the criteria a court should use in determining whether 
any particular liquidated damage provision is reasonable or is unenforceable as 
a penalty: (i) whether the amount seems reasonable in light of the anticipated 
damage from any breach; (ii) the problems of proving the actual damages 
resulting from any breach; and, (iii) the inconvenience, unavailability, or 
impracticability of any other adequate remedy. A recent case shows how vague 
a standard reasonableness becomes in determining the enforceability of a 
liquidated damage clause when reasonableness is detached from these criteria. 
In Skyline Steel Corp. v. A.]. Dupuis Co.,217 the parties entered into both a 
contract for the sale of steel sheet piling and a contract for the lease of additional 
steel sheet piling. The lease provided that the lessor was entitled to liquidated 
213. Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Master Engraving Co., 211 N.J. Super. 376, 381, 511 A.2d 
1227, 1229, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1551, 1553 (1986). 
214. The court divines this pillar from U.C.C § 1-102 & comments 1 & 2. 
215. This has its source in U.C.C. § 2-719 comment 1. 
216. Thus, the court stated: "It is only when the circumstances of the transaction, including the 
seller's breach, cause the consequential damage exclusion to be inconsistent with the intent and 
reasonable commercial expectations of the parties that invalidation of the exclusionary clause would 
be appropriate under the Code." 107 N.J. at 600, 527 A.2d at 438, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 
(Callaghan) at 1698. 
217. 648 F. Supp. 360, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 475 (E.D. Mich. 1986). 
1296 The Business Lawyer; Vol. 43, August 1988 
damages based on the purchase price in the contract of sale if the lessee 
defaulted on its obligation to make monthly lease payments. The court held that 
the liquidated damage provision in the lease was reasonable under section 2-
718( 1) and thus enforceable. 218 However, the court did not consider whether the 
plaintiff would have experienced difficulty in proving actual damages or 
whether failure to enforce the liquidated damage clause would deprive the 
plaintiff of any effective remedy. In fact, the opinion indicates that there was an 
established market for the goods in question so that the plaintiff's actual 
damages were easily determinable. 219 There is nothing to indicate the remedy of 
actual contract damages would have subjected either party to any greater 
inconvenience than that generated by the seller's enforcement of the liquidated 
damage provision. 
In essence, the court assumed its conclusion by focusing on whether or not the 
liquidated damage clause was "reasonable" without considering the explicit 
statutory definition for determining the reasonableness of all liquidated damage 
clauses under section 2-718(1). The analytical shortcomings of the court's 
decision may seem insignificant, since the seller's actual damages would proba-
bly have approximated the actual price contained in the contract of sale. But one 
can infer that the seller would have sought to recover actual damages if the 
market price of the pilings had markedly increased since the date of contract. 220 
SELLER'S MONEY REMEDIES 
Stokes v. Roberts221 considered a seller's right to recover incidental damages 
under U.C.C. section 2-710. The Stokeses entered into an agreement to sell 
their store (inventory, fixtures, and equipment) and a registered quarter horse 
to the Robertses. Soon after the buyers took possession of the store, they 
repudiated the contract, stopping payment on the checks given in payment of the 
purchase price. Having no reason to believe that the checks would not be paid 
when presented, the sellers paid off some outstanding debts including a balance 
of $31,000 on an existing mortgage on their home, apparently obtained to 
finance their business. When the Robertses' checks bounced, the Stokeses 
borrowed to cover the checks they had written and they again mortgaged their 
home to secure the debt. The trial court awarded damages to the Stokeses 
measured by the difference between the contract price and the value of the 
inventory and fixtures. 222 
The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed. It found no merit in the Stokeses' 
contention that the interest incurred on the loan should have been included in 
218. The court, relying on U.C.C. § 2-102, applied the U.C.C. to both components of the 
transaction because "[t]he contracts at issue involve a 'transaction in goods': the purchase and lease 
of steel." 648 F. Supp. at 364, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 481. 
219. Id. at 374-75, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 491. 
220. See supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text for a discussion of other issues raised in this 
case. 
221. 289 Ark. 319, 711 S.W.2d 757, 2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 520 (1986). 
222. This is the standard measure of damages provided for in U.C.C. § 2-708( 1 ). 
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the award as an item of incidental damages. 223 The court acknowledged a recent 
innovation in the application of section 2-710224 permitting recovery of interest 
expenses on borrowed money by aggrieved sellers.225 But the court said this is 
permitted only where the money was borrowed to enable the seller to perform 
the contract in question. In this case, neither the original nor the second loan 
was necessary to cover expenses incurred by performance in reliance on the 
contract. Rather, the original loan antedated the contract and the second was 
obtained only because of the Stokeses decision to use the proceeds to pay off a 
pre-existing debt. 
Another approach was possible. The court could have said that the interest 
expense fell under the heading of consequential damages and that cortsequen-
tials are not recoverable by a seller. 226 But the question remains, why no 
consequentials for a seller? 221 In this case, at least, there was a reason. When the 
Stokeses voluntarily retook possession of their store,228 they traded in their right 
to the purchase price for the right to damages measured by the market-contract 
differential. 229 Since the sellers chose to forego the purchase price, it would be 
anamolous to compensate them for nonpayment. 
Courts must be ever vigilant for awards that overcompensate, since com-
plaining parties inevitably will seek them. Such was the lesson in Common-
wealth Edison Co. v. Decker Coal Co. 230 In order to safeguard an adequate 
supply of low sulphur coal, Commonwealth Edison agreed to purchase from 
Decker an interest in coal deposits. But when alternate energy sources became 
223. The court was unsure whether the claim was for interest on the first or second loan but 
thought the result would be the same in either case. 289 Ark. at 320, 711 S.W.2d at 758, 2 U.C.C. 
Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 522. 
224. U.C.C. § 2-708( 1) permits the recovery of incidental damages in accordance with U.C.C. 
§ 2-710. This latter section provides for reimbursement of "any commercially reasonable charges, 
expenses or commissions incurred in stopping delivery, in the transportation, care and custody of 
goods after the buyer's breach, in connection with return or resale of the goods or otherwise 
resulting from the breach." U.C.C. § 2-710. 
225. As the trend setters, the court cites Bulk Oil (U.S.A.), Inc. v. Sun bit, 697 F.2d 481, 35 
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 23 (2d Cir. 1983); Intermeat v. American Poultry, 575 F.2d 1017, 
23 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 925 (2d Cir. 1978); Atlas Concrete Pipe, Inc. v. Roger J. Au & 
Son, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 830, 26 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 395 (E.D. Mich. 1979), rev'd on 
other grounds, 668 F.2d 905 (6th Cir. 1982); Gray v. West, 608 S.W.2d 771, 31 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
(Callaghan) 568 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980). 
226. Nowhere does the Code explicitly authorize the seller's recovery of consequential damages. 
The situation is different for a non-breaching buyer. The buyer's market-contract rule permits a 
recovery of consequentials. U.C.C. § 2-713(1). Where the buyer has covered, consequentials are 
also recoverable. U.C.C. § 2-712(2). 
227. To deny the seller, in all cases, the recovery of consequentials would seem to run counter to 
the remedial policy expressed in U.C.C. § 1-106 that the aggrieved party should be placed in the 
position it would have been in had the breaching party fully performed. 
228. Although not explicitly stated in the opinion, the facts given and the measure of damages 
approved by the court strongly suggest that the Strokeses regained possession of the store following 
the Robertses' breach. 
229. A seller in possession of goods is generally not entitled to recover the price. See U.C.C. § 2-
709. 
230. 653 F. Supp. 841, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 601 (N.D. Ill. 1987). 
1298 The Business Lawyer; Vol. 43, August 1988 
more economical, Commonwealth Edison reneged. When Decker sued, Com-
monwealth Edison admitted there was no market for these now valueless 
reserves. 231 What more could Decker ask for? The admission meant Decker was 
qualified to recover the. purchase price under U.C.C. section 2-709( t)(b). 232 But 
if Commonwealth Edison paid the purchase price, it would be entitled to get the 
reserves. 233 Trying to get the price and the coal reserves too, Decker argued that 
notwithstanding its right to the price under section 2-709 it could elect to 
recover its lost profits under U.C.C. section 2-708(2), which, coincidentally, 
equalled the purchase price.234 But recovery under section 2-708(2) would carry 
with it no duty to deliver the reserves. Relying on (i) the remedial policy 
expressed in U.C.C. section 1-106, (ii) the statutory language of sections 2-708 
and 2-709, (iii) case law, and (iv) the intent of the drafters of section 2-708, 
Judge Moran had little difficulty deciding that the U.C.C. does not condone a 
windfall. 235 Hence, Decker's recovery was limited to whatever would be avail-
able to it in an action on the price.236 
Universal Power Systems v. Godfather's Pizza231 is a case exploring the 
calculation of damages for breach of a requirements contract. The parties 
entered into a contract whereby Universal was to be Godfather's exclusive 
supplier of deep dish pizza pans and supplies. Subsequently, Godfather's 
underwent a change in ownership and operation and its new operators refused 
to recognize a commitment to purchase from Universal. Instead, they issued a 
purchase order to Chicago Metallic Products ("Chicago Metallic") for 
$1,675,626.48 worth of goods. As it turned out, Godfather's was unable to 
complete its contract with Chicago Metallic and only $911,927.35 worth of 
goods were actually delivered and paid for under the contract. 
231. The reason for assigning a zero value to the reserves is that the cost of mining and removing 
the coal would exceed the obtainable sale price. 
232. The court mistakenly refers to U.C.C. § 2-709(1 )(a) as the relevant section when, in fact, 
the controlling provision is U.C.C. § 2-709(1)(b). An action for the purchase price may be 
maintained "if the seller is unable after reasonable effort to resell [the goods] or the circumstances 
reasonably indicate that such effort will be unavailing." U.C.C. § 2-709( 1 )(b). Ordinarily no other 
measure of general damages will generate a recovery quite as large as the purchase price. For this 
reason, most cases involving U.C.C. § 2-709 are those where the seller attempts to convince a court 
of its applicability. 
233. See U.C.C. § 2-709(2). 
234. It equalled the purchase price because, according to Decker, the resale credit was $0.00. 
This same result could have been achieved under U.C.C. § 2-708( 1) by subtracting the market price 
($0.00) from the contract price. 
235. The only support for Decker's contention that the court was able to locate was the 
statement in U.C.C. § 2-703 comment 1 that "the remedies are essentially cumulative in nature." 
Reading this statement in the context of the Code's underlying purpose and policies, the court 
refused to believe that it authorized a windfall. 653 F. Supp. at 845, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 
(Callaghan) at 607. 
236. As an item of incidental damages, the court also allowed recovery of delay damages, i.e., 
prejudgment interest. The court, for no apparent reason other than convenience, used the contract 
rate of interest to calculate the award. Id. at 845, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 607. 
237. 818 F.2d 667, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1748 (8th Cir. 1987). 
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The first issue was whether the district court erred in admitting the Chicago 
Metallic $1.6 million purchase order into evidence. The district court ruled that 
the purchase order was relevant to Universal's damages because it permitted a 
finding by the jury that had Godfather's not breached its contract with Univer-
sal, Universal would have received the order. The Eighth Circuit disagreed. It 
concluded that where a requirements contract is involved, the relevant issue is 
not the volume of goods the buyer believed it would require, but the buyer's 
actual good faith requirements during the period in question. To establish the 
latter, one has to look at actual "purchases from any other source during some 
relevant and comparable time period."238 
The second issue in Godfather's was related to the first. When Godfather's 
failed to complete its contract with Chicago Metallic, it paid Chicago Metallic 
an additional $411,816.65 in settlement of an apparent breach of contract claim. 
Universal contended that this sum should be included in the damage base for 
Universal's lost profits239 because, but for Godfather's breach, it would have 
been paid the $400,000 for nonfulfillment of the $1.6 million dollar purchase 
order it would have received. The court concluded that this reasoning was 
fatally flawed because Universal did not have a "firm" contract for a specific 
amount of goods; Godfather's would have bought only what it needed. Thus, the 
proper damage base was $911,927.35, the goods actually paid for and supplied 
by Chicago Metallic. 
With the damage base established, the Eighth Circuit next focused on the 
jury's acceptance of 31.4% as the correct profit margin. In particular, the court 
had to decide whether the profit margin should be reduced to account for three 
items of overhead: warehouse expense, depreciation on the deep dish equipment, 
and salary increases resulting from the increased sales. Correctly interpreting 
the "reasonable overhead" language of U.C.C. section 2-708(2) to include fixed 
overhead costs but not variable overhead costs, the court held that substantial 
evidence supported the jury's determination that these were fixed costs. 
STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS 
Previous surveys have noted that the argument that a party is estopped from 
raising the statute of limitations is rarely successful.240 The argument typically 
arises in a breach of warranty case where the conduct allegedly raising the 
estoppel is the promise of repair or failed attempts at repair. 241 
238. 818 F.2d at 672, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1754. In the court's opinion, a 
contract to purchase manifests only an expectation of "possible requirements." Id. 
239. Universal's entitlement to its lost profits is assumed throughout the opinion. Perhaps the 
absence of discussion means the court thought that the point was obvious. It is undoubtedly true that 
a manufacturer of goods who has yet to manufacture the goods can only be made whole if recovery is 
had under the lost profits formula of U.C.C. § 2-708(2). 
240. 1986 Annual Survey, supra note 28, at 1392-93; 1987 Annual Survey, supra note 28, at 
1256. 
241. In past years, buyers have also argued, with little success, that the seller's standard repair 
or replacement warranty constituted a future performance warranty. This year, buyers fared a bit 
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This year's factually atypical case was L.R. Foy Construction Co. v. South 
Dakota State Cement Plant Commission. 242 Cement Plant agreed to supply 
Spearfish Ready-Mix ("Ready-Mix") with its 1978 requirements for cement. 
Cement Plant did not have enough cement to perform its obligations in full and 
worked out an accommodation with Ready-Mix without revealing that, con-
trary to a public statement that South Dakota residents would be given prefer-
ence, it had entered into a substantial contract with a new customer in Colorado 
that was given preference. Ready-Mix did not learn of this preference until 
1984, at which time it brought an action against Cement Plant on a breach of 
contract theory. The trial court dismissed the action on the grounds that it was 
untimely. The Supreme Court of South Dakota held that the facts alleged 
would equitably estop Cement Plant from raising the statute of limitations and 
remanded the case for further proceedings. The court noted the following 
elements to the estoppel: "[i] false representations or concealment of material 
facts must exist; (ii] the party to whom it was made must have been without 
knowledge of the real facts; [iii] th[e] representations or concealment must have 
been made with the intention that it should be acted upon; and [iv] the party to 
whom it was made must have relied thereon to his prejudice or injury."243 
While this is not a breach of warranty case and the acts of Cement Plant are 
not savory, the case is troublesome. The court struggles with whether there were 
separate tort and breach of contract claims. 244 If there were separate claims, the 
court should have analyzed the breach of contract claim more closely. Cement 
Plant was obliged to deliver cement; shortfalls in performance of this obligation 
would be excused if Cement Plant followed the procedures set out in U.C.C. 
section 2-615. It failed to do so and, therefore, was not excused from its 
obligations. The failure to perform would be a breach of contract which would 
accrue at the time when delivery was due. On these facts, the statute of 
limitations would have run. The plaintiff would not be without a remedy 
because a separate cause of action would lie for the tort of misrepresentation 
that would have its own statute of limitations and rules on accrual of the cause 
of action. 
better. See Long Island Lighting Co. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 646 F. Supp. 1442, 2 U.C.C. 
Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1333 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (breach of an express promise to repair or replace 
arises when the equipment malfunctions); Trunkline LNG Co. v. Trane Thermal Co., 722 S.W.2d 
722, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 586 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (the statute of limitations begins 
to run after a reasonable period of time to repair or replace has expired). 
242. 399 N.W.2d 340, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 630 (S.D. 1987). 
243. 399 N.W.2d at 344, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 637, citing Taylor v. Tripp, 
330 N.W.2d 542, 545 (S.D. 1983). 
244. Ready-Mix alleged tort claims of fraud and deceit, negligent misrepresentation, and 
tortious interference with contract. The court does not decide whether these independent tort claims 
exist. In a special concurrence, however, Justice Henderson would allow the case to proceed under 
alternative theories that sound in either contract or tort, and points out that the tort claims are not 
subject to the U.C.C. statute of limitations. 399 N .W.2d at 349-51, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 
(Callaghan) at 643-44. 
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Even if, as the court concluded, equitable estoppel applies to the running of 
the statute of limitations on the contract claim, it would have been preferable if 
the court had relied on the law on tolling of statutes of limitations which is 
explicitly saved by U.C.C. section 2-725( 4 ). Under general rules on tolling, 
presumably the statute would only be tolled until the plaintiff knew or should 
have known of the breach-a refinement that the blunter instrument of equita-
ble estoppel does not clearly recognize. 
The most noteworthy of this year's factually typical cases245 was Sierra Diesel 
Injection Service v. Burroughs Corp. 246 The seller of a computer attempted to 
modify and replace a computer model in order to fulfill the contract but these 
attempts were ultimately unsuccessful and the buyer purchased another com-
puter. In subsequent litigation claiming, inter alia, breach of contract and 
warranty, the buyer argued that the attempted repairs tolled the statute of 
limitations under U.C.C. section 2-725( 4 ). The court concluded that the at-
tempts did toll the statute, citing cases that the court characterized as both 
stating the "general rule"247 and being "the more persuasive opinions."248 
The court is probably wrong in its statement of the general rule and it makes 
no attempt to discuss the less persuasive opinions. 249 Moreover, the court 
provides no reasons for arriving at the result it does and is therefore little help in 
developing reasoned jurisprudence. 
With the proliferation of statutes and new theories of liabjlity, it is hardly 
surprising to discover that sometimes a sought-after remedy or cause of action 
can bear two different names. It is for courts to decide whether the name 
matters and two recent cases suggest that the name matters little. 
In Bancorp Leasing !/:r Financing Corp. v. Augusta Aviation Corp.,250 the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals was called upon to decide which statute of 
limitations was controlling, U.C.C. section 2-725 or Oregon's two-year product 
24S. One typical case was Kemp v. Bell-View, Inc., 179 Ga. App. S77, 346 S.E.2d 923, 2 
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 178 (1986) (short of fraud, promises to repair will not toll the 
statute of limitations). 
246. 648 F. Supp. 1148, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 646 (D. Nev. 1986). Although the 
contract provided for application of Michigan law, the court decided that the law of the forum, 
Nevada, was controlling on statute of limitations issues. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text. 
247. 648 F. Supp. at 11S2, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 6SO. 
248. 648 F. Supp. at 11 S3, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 6Sl. The court cited Aced v. 
Hobbs-Sesack Plumbing Co., SS Cal. 2d S73, 360 P.2d 897, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2S7 (1961); Styron v. 
Loman Garret Supply Co., 6 N.C. App. 67S, 171 S.E.2d 21 (1970); Mid City Finance Co. v. 
Coleman, 232 So. 2d 918 (La. Ct. App. 1970). 
249. Some of the less persuasive opinions are Standard Alliance Indus. v. Black Clawson Co., 
S87 F.2d 813, 2S U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 6S (6th Cir. 1978); Peerless Pump v. Blythe-
Vanguard Construction Corp., 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 494 (S.D.N.Y. 198S); Tomes v. 
Chrysler Corp., 60 Ill. App. 3d 707, 377 N.E.2d 224, 24 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1S6 
(1978). 
2SO. 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 627 (9th Cir. 1987), opinion amended, 813 F.2d 272, 
3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 141S (9th Cir. 1987). 
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liability statute. 261 The buyer sought recovery for property damage to its 
helicopter when the landing gear collapsed, allegedly due to a design defect. The 
court was of the opinion that the Oregon legislature intended the products 
liability statute to be applicable to all products-related claims even if the claim 
bore the name "breach of warranty."262 
The other case was Firestone & Parson, Inc. v. Union League of Philadel-
phia.263 More than four years after purchasing an oil painting, the buyers 
learned that it was probably not painted by the artist that the parties originally 
assumed. The buyers attempted to escape the stricture of section 2-725 by 
characterizing their suit as a claim for rescission of contract based upon mutual 
mistake of fact. The attempt failed. The district court could not see how this 
claim was any different from litigation predicated on the U.C.C. remedy of 
revocation of acceptance. The court also noted that, to the extent the buyers 
were asking for damages, their lawsuit was indistinguishable from one for 
breach of warranty. 
Now that the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International 
Sale of Goods has come into force on January 1, 1988, there will be more 
interest in related conventions. An earlier U.N. convention is particularly 
relevant to the statute of limitations: the Convention on the Limitation Period of 
the International Sale of Goods, 197 4, as amended by a 1980 Protocol.264 Eight 
countries have ratified or acceded to the unamended 1974 convention-Argen-
tina, Czechoslovakia, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Ghana, Hungary, Norway, 
and Yugoslavia-but not all these countries have adopted the 1980 Protocol. 
Ten states must become party to the convention before the convention will come 
into force. The United States has taken no formal steps to accede to the 
convention. 
DOCUMENTS OF TITLE 
There was one case of interest under article 7. U.C.C. section 7-204(2) 
permits a warehouseman to limit his liability for loss of or injury to goods stored 
251. See Or. Rev. Stat. § 30.905 (1985 ). Another case involving a competing statute of limita-
tions is Desai v. Chasnoff, 146 Ill. App. 3d 163, 496 N.E.2d 1203, 2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 
(Callaghan) 174 (1986), holding that Ill. Rev. Stat. Ann. ch. 110, para. 13-212 (1984) relating to 
malpractice suits against physicians and hospitals was the controlling statute where it was alleged 
that an infant died of a "DPT" shot. 
252. The court, citing with approval East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 106 
S. Ct. 2295, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 609 (1986), intimated that if it were free to ignore 
Oregon law, it would label as a breach of warranty claim any claim not involving personal injury or 
damage to property other than the product itself. See 1987 Survey, supra note 28, at 1219-22. 
253. 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 449 (E.D. Pa. 1987). 
254. See Note by Secretariat, Status of Conventions (U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/304) (Feb. 19, 1988). 
The text of the limitations convention (A/CONF 63/15) is reprinted in United Nations Conference 
on Prescription (Limitation) in the International Sale of Goods-Official Records 101-05 (Sales 
No. E.74.V.8) (1975). The 1980 Protocol (A/CONF.97/18, annex II) is reprinted in United 
Nations Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods-Official Records 191-92 
(Sales No. E.82.V.5) (1980). 
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with him, unless the warehouseman has converted the goods to his own use. 
When the disappearance of stored goods is unexplained, who has the burden of 
proof on the conversion question? In International Nickel Co. v. Trammel Crow 
Distribution Corp.,255 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, applying Texas law, 
predicted that Texas courts would not presume that the warehouseman had 
converted the goods to its own use. The loss of some 71,000 pounds of nickel 
worth over $260,000 was unexplained. On appeal from a summary judgment 
for the warehouseman, the court refused to invalidate, by presuming conversion, 
a limitation of liability provision that would permit the bailor to recover only 
$11,000. However, the court did conclude that the limitation provision might be 
unenforceable because of misrepresentations by the warehouseman that annual 
physical inventories had been performed;256 thus, it reversed and remanded. 
BULK TRANSFERS: ARTICLE 6 REVISION 
A drafting committee of the National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL") and the American Law Institute, under the 
chairmanship of Gerald L. Bepko, has been considering the revision of U.C.C. 
article 6 since 1985.257 The drafting committee is expected to recommend that 
the NCCUSL present each state with the option of either (i) replacing the 
existing bulk sales article with a revised article 6, or (ii) repealing article 6 and 
not replacing it. 
At this writing, revised article 6 has not been finalized, but the salient 
features of the February 1988 draft are likely to remain unchanged. The revised 
article 6 is likely to define a "bulk sale" as a sale, not in the ordinary course of 
the seller's business, of more than half the seller's personal property as mea-
sured by value, where the buyer has notice, or after reasonable inquiry would 
have notice, that the seller will not continue to operate the same or a similar 
kind of business after the sale. 
Thus, unlike existing article 6, which applies only to sales of inventory and 
related equipment by businesses that are principally engaged in the sale of 
merchandise from stock, revised article 6 is likely to apply to sales of all 
personal property held for business use by all types of businesses. In sales that 
are subject to revised article 6, the buyer will have the duty of notifying the 
seller's creditors of the sale. Where the seller has a large number of creditors, 
the buyer may either file a notice with the secretary of state or give notice to 
each creditor individually. Where the seller has a small number of creditors, the 
buyer must give individual notice. The notice must include a copy of a schedule 
stating to whom the purchase price will be distributed. 
255. 803 F.2d 150, 2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 594 (5th Cir. 1986). 
256. The court also found that the misrepresentations could result in liability under the Texas 
Deceptive Trade Practices Act. Tex. Bus. & Comm. Code Ann.§§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon Supp. 1987). 
257. See Harris, The Article 6 Drafting CommiUee's New Approach lo Asset Acquisitions, 42 
Bus. Law. 1261 (1987) for background. 
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Unlike existing article 6, which allows aggrieved creditors to reach the 
transferred property in the hands of a noncomplying buyer, the revised article is 
likely to provide for a damages remedy against the buyer who fails to comply 
with the notice requirements of the article. Damages will be limited by the 
amount of the creditor's claim against the seller and by the amount of the 
purchase price, and a buyer who makes a good faith effort to comply with the 
article but fails to do so may be entitled to credit for amounts paid to other 
creditors of the seller. 258 
258. Members of the Ad Hoc Committee on Bulk Transfers, chaired by Howard Ruda and 
Steven L. Harris, have received drafts of revised article 6. Mr. Ruda, who succeeded Mr. Harris as 
the ABA's advisor to the drafting committee when the latter joined William D. Hawkland as a co-
reporter, has informed interested ABA members of developments in the drafting process and 
conveyed the reactions of ABA members to the drafting committee. 
Any Business Law Section member who wishes to join the Ad Hoc Committee on Bulk Transfers 
should contact Howard Ruda at Hahn & Hessen, 350 Fifth Avenue, New York, New York 10118. 
Anyone wishing a copy of revised article 6 should write to the Executive Secretary, National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 676 N. St. Clair Street, Chicago, Illinois 
60611. 
